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A large part of the literature on frictional matching in the labor market assumes bilateral
meetings between workers and ﬁrms. This ignores the frictions that arise when workers and
ﬁrms meet in a multilateral way and cannot coordinate their application and hiring decisions.
I analyze the magnitude of these frictions. For this purpose, I present an equilibrium search
model of the labor market with an endogenous number of contacts between workers and ﬁrms.
Workers contact ﬁrms by applying to vacancies, whereas ﬁrms contact applicants by interview-
ing them. Sending more applications and interviewing more applicants are both costly activities
but increase the probability to match. In equilibrium, contract dispersion arises endogenously
and workers spread their applications over the different types of contracts. Estimation of the
model on the Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects data set provides values for the funda-
mental parameters of the model, including the cost of an application, the cost of an interview,
and the value of non-market time. These estimates are used to determine the loss in social
surplus compared to a Walrasian world. Frictions on the worker and the ﬁrm side each cause
approximately half of the 4.7% loss. There is a potential role for activating labor market poli-
cies, because I show that for the estimated parameter values welfare is improved if unemployed
workers increase their search intensity.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Summary
In most labor markets, the interaction between ﬁrms and workers is of a decentralized nature. In
such a world, matching is often subject to frictions in the sense that it takes time and/or effort to ﬁnd
the right trading partner. Various authors have proposed equilibrium models which account for such
frictions, with Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Burdett & Mortensen (1998) being prominent
examples. These models have been used to analyze a wide spectrum of topics, such as the effects
of various government policies.1
An important assumption in most of this literature - either explicit or implicit - is that meetings
between workers and ﬁrms are bilateral. In reality however, this is rarely the case. Firms typically
receive multiple applications after posting a vacancy and need time to select the worker that they
wish to hire. This screening may cause a signiﬁcant delay between the moment at which a worker
applies to the job and the point at which the ﬁrm makes the hiring decision.2 Such delays provide
the workers with an incentive to send multiple applications at once in order to reduce the risk of
remaining unemployed for a prolonged period of time.3 Hence, multilateral meetings - rather than
bilateral meetings - are a natural feature of decentralized labor markets.
The distinction between both types of meetings is important since they have different implica-
tions for the nature of the competition between agents. With bilateral meetings, a ﬁrm and a worker
only compare each other to the option value of continued search when deciding whether to match
or not. When meetings are multilateral instead, an applicant that would have gotten the job if he
had been the only one meeting the ﬁrm, may now be rejected just because another applicant is con-
sidered slightly more qualiﬁed. Likewise, a ﬁrm wanting to hire a certain worker may now fail to
succeed just because the worker prefers a position at a different ﬁrm. Hence, multilateral meetings
may introduce additional frictions into the matching process.
These frictions get magniﬁed when sending applications and screening workers are costly ac-
tivities. A ﬁrm turning down the application of a worker imposes a negative externality since the
worker had spent valuable resources on applying. Similarly, a worker rejecting a job offer imposes
a negative externality on the ﬁrm by causing the resources spent on screening to be wasted. These
externalities can potentially have important implications for understanding labor market outcomes
or for the desirability of government programs that aim to increase the search intensity of unem-
ployed workers. It is therefore crucial to understand the magnitude of these externalities and of the
costs that generate them.
1See e.g. Lise et al. (2005), Cahuc et al. (2008), and Albrecht et al. (2009).
2For example, van Ours & Ridder (1992) study vacancy durations in the Dutch labor market and ﬁnd that after most
applications have arrived, it still takes a ﬁrm on average about 3 months to ﬁll the vacancy. Larger values are found for
positions requiring university degrees.
3See for example Morgan & Manning (1985).
2In this paper, I analyze these issues, both theoretically and empirically by endogenizing the match-
ing function. I present an equilibrium model with multilateral meetings between workers and ﬁrms
in which ﬁrms post contracts to attract applicants. Unemployed workers observe these contracts and
decide where to apply. An important novelty compared to existing models is that both workers and
ﬁrms can choose how many agents on the other side of the market they want to contact. Sending
many applications reduces the worker’s probability of remaining unemployed, but is costly. There-
fore, a worker will typically decide to apply to multiple but not all ﬁrms. A similar structure holds
for the ﬁrms. A ﬁrm contacts applicants by inviting them for an interview. Interviewing applicants
is a costly but necessary activity before job offers can be made, hence it reduces the probability for
a ﬁrm to remain unmatched. As a result, ﬁrms typically choose to interview multiple but not all
applicants.
A lack of coordination between individual workers and ﬁrms will cause the limited number of
contactsonbothsidesofthemarkettoresultinthetwotypesoffrictionsoutlinedabove. Throughout
this paper, I will refer to the ﬁrst friction (two workers may apply to the same ﬁrm; only one can
get the job and the other one has wasted a costly application) as the search friction. I call the
corresponding friction on the ﬁrm side (two ﬁrms may interview the same candidate; only one can
hire him and the other ﬁrm has wasted a costly interview) the recruitment friction.4
Together, these frictions are responsible for the externalities in the labor market. The two fun-
damental parameters of the model, i.e. the cost of an application and the cost of an interview,
determine the magnitude of the frictions and the externalities. For example, if the cost of an ap-
plication is really low, workers will decide to apply a lot and the search friction will be limited.
However, ﬁrms now face a lot of competition for each worker, so the recruitment friction will be
severe. On the other hand, if the cost of an interview is sufﬁciently close to zero, ﬁrms would be
able to contact all applicants and the recruitment friction would be absent.
After specifying the model, I characterize the equilibrium. I show that different types of con-
tracts are offered by the ﬁrm. Some ﬁrms offer low wages but contact many applicants, while other
ﬁrms do the opposite. The number of contract types is equal to the maximum number of applica-
tions that workers send in any given period and ﬁrms are indifferent between all types. Workers face
a trade-off between the wage and the job offer probability. Applications to low wage ﬁrms are more
likely to turn into job offers than applications to high wage ﬁrms. I show that workers maximize
the payoff from their application portfolio by spreading their applications over the different types of
contracts.
The model is estimated on the Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects data set, which contains
detailed information on the recruitment processes of a sample of ﬁrms. The estimation provides
values for the search cost and the recruitment cost, as well as the workers’ value of non-market
4Albrecht et al. (2004, 2006) discuss both frictions in a theoretical setting, but call them the ‘urn-ball friction’ and
the ‘multiple-application friction’ respectively. See also Gautier & Moraga-Gonzalez (2005).
3time. An additional application is found to cost a worker 0.73 hours of his time. Firms incur a cost
equal to 1.97 hours of production for each interview. The value of non-market time is estimated
at 0.950. I discuss that this high estimate is necessary to explain why ﬁrms do not spent a larger
amount of resources on recruitment.
By simulating the equilibrium for different values of the two cost parameters, the market equi-
librium can be compared with worlds in which one of the frictions or both of the frictions are absent.
Social surplus is 4.7% lower in the market equilibrium than in a Walrasian world. Search and re-
cruitment frictions each contribute approximately the same amount to this output loss. Each is also
responsible for roughly half of the frictional unemployment arising in equilibrium.
Finally, I consider a social planner’s problem to analyze the effect of UI eligibility rules that
specify a minimum search intensity. The planner chooses a certain minimum level, after which
workers decide whether they comply or not. I show that if unemployed workers increase their
searchintensityinresponsetotheserules, ﬁrmsindeedneedtospendmoreresourcesonrecruitment.
Nevertheless, their matching probability decreases due to the increased competition that they face
for any given candidate. However, for modest increases in the search intensity, social surplus rises.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper adds to the literature in multiple ways. First of all, the paper extends the literature on
micro-founded matching technologies by analyzing a model with an arbitrary number of contacts
on both the supply and the demand side. Let A denote the number of applications per worker and
let I be the number of interviews per ﬁrm.5 Various authors have analyzed different combinations
of A and I. For example, the seminal stable matching outcome of Gale & Shapley (1962) can be
interpreted as a model with A ! ¥ and I ! ¥.6 This case, which has been applied extensively in
the analysis of many different markets, would allow all workers in my model to apply to all ﬁrms
and all ﬁrms to contact all workers.7
The other extreme is a situation with A = 1 and I = 1, i.e. all workers send one application and
all ﬁrms can contact one worker. This is the matching technology explored by e.g. Peters (1991,
2000), Acemoglu & Shimer (2000) and Burdett et al. (2001). Julien et al. (2000) study a model
in which workers apply to all ﬁrms, and ﬁrms can bid for the services of one worker, i.e. A ! ¥
and I = 1. Albrecht et al. (2004, 2006) and Galenianos & Kircher (2009) also impose I = 1, but
study the case in which workers send multiple applications simultaneously, i.e. A > 1.8 Gautier &
5In the model described in this paper, both variables are endogenous and have a stochastic nature (see section 2). I
abstract from that here in order to keep the comparison with the existing literature as clear as possible.
6The paper by Gale & Shapley (1962) includes a lot more heterogeneity on both sides of the market than most other
models. I do not consider that aspect in this discussion.
7Parallel to the search literature, a large literature on matching has been developed with extensions, reﬁnements and
applications of the original model by Gale & Shapley (1962). See Roth (2008) for a recent overview.
8In a technical appendix to their paper, Albrecht et al. (2006) brieﬂy discuss what happens if ﬁrms can contact a



































send out. The horizontal axis displays the number of interviews I that a ﬁrm can conduct. GS = Gale &
Shapley (1962), P = Peters (1991, 2000), JKK = Julien et al. (2000), AS = Acemoglu & Shimer (2000),
BSW = Burdett et al. (2001), AGV = Albrecht et al. (2004, 2006), GK = Galenianos & Kircher (2009), K
= Kircher (2009). In Peters (1991, 2000), Acemoglu & Shimer (2000) and Burdett et al. (2001), I is
assumed to be 1, but the ﬁrst interview always leads to a match, so the equilibrium is the same for I > 1 as
indicated by the dashed line.
Figure 1: Related literature
Moraga-Gonzalez (2005), Kaas (2010) and Gautier et al. (2009) study a similar matching process in
a random search setting. Finally, Kircher (2009) studies a model with A > 1 applications in which
ﬁrms can contact all their applicants (I ! ¥).
By allowing for arbitrary values of A and I, the model presented here includes the matching
technologies in all the cited papers as special cases. Moreover, it goes beyond these papers by ex-
ploring combinations of A and I that have not been studied before. This is summarized in ﬁgure
1. A related but equally important novelty is that the aggregate matching function in this paper is
endogenous. While most of the literature simply imposes a particular functional form as a techno-
logical constraint, the matching function in this paper arises as the result of optimal decision making
on both sides of the market given the costs that agents face to meet a trading partner. In that sense,
the paper is related to Lagos (2000).
The empirical analysis in section 4 will indicate which values of A and I are consistent with the
data and which values of the cost parameters correspond to them. As argued, these values can be
used to assess the efﬁciency of the decentralized equilibrium and the magnitude of the search and
recruitment friction. I do so in section 4.6. In this sense, the paper is related to contributions by
e.g. Ridder & van den Berg (2003), Flinn (2006), and Gautier et al. (2009), who all empirically
assess the matching frictions and/or efﬁciency in the labor market. Knowledge of A and I is also
relevant for further research along the lines of Eeckhout & Kircher (2009) who show that a seller’s
optimal sales mechanism depends on whether the meetings with buyers are bilateral (i.e. A = I = 1)
5or multilateral (A > 1, I > 1).
Finally, this paper adds to the literature on recruitment decisions by ﬁrms. Barron et al. (1985),
Barron et al. (1987) and Burdett & Cunningham (1998) study the determinants of employer search
measures using the same data set as this paper. van Ours & Ridder (1992, 1993) and Abbring &
van Ours (1994) analyze Dutch recruitment data and ﬁnd evidence for simultaneous rather than
sequential search by ﬁrms. All these papers have in common that they consider partial equilibrium
models. Villena-Roldan (2008) develops an equilibrium model in which workers are heterogeneous
and ﬁrms choose how many applicants to screen. However, all workers apply only once, which
makes the model unsuitable for studying recruitment frictions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model in a static setting. The
dynamic model is presented in section 3. Section 4 reports the results of the empirical analysis and
section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Static Model
This section introduces a simple model of two-sided simultaneous search. In order to develop intu-
ition for the key mechanisms, a number of strong assumptions are made. In particular, 1) the model
is static, 2) the number of applications per worker is exogenous, and 3) workers are homogeneous
in their productivity. These assumptions will be relaxed in the dynamic model in the next section.
That model will embed the static model presented here in the sense that the agents solve it in each
period.
2.1 Setting
Consider a labor market with a mass u of unemployed workers and a positive measure v of ﬁrms,
determined by free entry. Both types of agents are risk-neutral. All workers supply one indivisible
unit of labor, while each ﬁrm has a position that can be ﬁlled by exactly one worker. Workers aim to
match with ﬁrms with vacancies by sending applications. Both ﬁrms and workers are homogeneous
in terms of their productivity while matched.
The period consists of several phases. At the beginning of the period, ﬁrms decide whether they
want to enter the market by creating a vacancy. The vacancy cost is kV > 0. In order to attract
applications from workers, entering ﬁrms post a contract c. Each ﬁrm commits to its contract for
the remainder of the period. A contract consists of two elements, both of which are choice variables
to the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst component of the contract is the fraction w2W [0;1] of output that the ﬁrm promises
to pay to the worker that it hires. Specifying a worker’s compensation as a piece rate rather than a
ﬁxed amount will later prove notationally convenient, but is without loss of generality in the setup
6that I consider. Therefore, I will typically refer to w as the worker’s wage. The second component
of the contract is a recruitment technology r 2R[1;¥), which can be interpreted as a measure for
the amount of time that the ﬁrm will spend on interviewing workers, or alternatively as a measure
for the number of recruiters that the ﬁrm hires. The frictions in the labor market are less severe if
the ﬁrm spends a lot of time on interviewing, as I will explain below. A higher value of r therefore
increases the matching probability of both the ﬁrm and the workers applying to the ﬁrm. However,
choosing a higher value for r is also more costly for the ﬁrm. I assume that the cost of recruitment
technology r equals kR(r 1)  0.9 Summarizing, a contract c is pair (r;w). For future reference,




The next phase is the search phase, during which unemployed workers can search for a job
by sending applications. Workers observe all posted contracts and base their search decision on
this information. Since there is a delay between sending the application letters and learning their
result, workers may have an incentive to send multiple applications simultaneously (see Morgan &
Manning, 1985). Sending multiple applications is more costly than applying only once, since each
application takes time and effort, but has two positive effects. First, it reduces the risk of not getting
any job offer and remaining unemployed. Second, if there is wage dispersion in equilibrium, it
increases the probability to get a high wage offer. For the moment, I assume that all workers send
A applications in each period, where A is a ﬁnite integer larger than 1. Workers decide to which
contracts they wish to apply.
After the applications are sent, the recruitment phase starts. During the recruitment phase,
each of the ﬁrms will interview a number of applicants. The number of interviews R that a ﬁrm
can conduct (its ‘interview capacity’) is a random variable which follows a distribution around the
ﬁrm’s recruitment technology r. The intuition for this setup is as follows. In reality, a ﬁrm can
roughly determine the number of applicants it is able to interview by hiring more or fewer recruiters
or by allocating more or less time to recruitment. However, the exact capacity often also depends on
factors that cannot be anticipated by the ﬁrm. For example, some recruiters may unexpectedly not be
available at the moment of hiring, or the screening of a certain candidate takes longer or shorter than
foreseen. Having a stochastic element in the recruitment capacity captures this. For computational
reasons, it is convenient to have a distribution that generates closed-form expressions for variables
like the matching probability. As I will show in section 2.3, a geometric distribution does precisely
this. Therefore, I assume that the actual interview capacity follows a geometric distribution with
parameter r 1





r, which implies that the expected capacity is exactly equal to the ﬁrm’s investment,
9The ﬁrst unit of capacity is free, since it assumed to be included in the entry cost. This assumption is not restrictive,
but rules out a situation in which a large kR dissuades ﬁrms from interviewing any candidates which would lead to the
collapse of the market. As will become clear, the model now converges to the model in which all ﬁrms interview one
applicant, as described in Galenianos & Kircher (2009), for kR ! ¥.
7i.e. E[R] = r.10
The ﬁrm’s interview capacity R is realized at the beginning of the recruitment phase and there-
fore not observed by the workers. Note that the actual number of interviews a ﬁrm conducts may
be constrained by the number of applicants. If the ﬁrm receives a applications, the number of inter-
views taking place will be minfa;Rg. If the number of applicants exceeds the interview capacity,
candidates are chosen randomly since they all seem identical to the ﬁrm. Remaining applicants are
rejected. During the interview the ﬁrm learns the outcome of a stochastic process that is iid over all
ﬁrm-worker pairs. With probability f 2 (0;1], the ﬁrm and the worker form a good match and are
indeed able to produce output. I call these candidates ‘qualiﬁed’. With probability 1 f however,
the match is considered a bad match which would be completely unproductive. The ﬁrm rejects
these unqualiﬁed applicants.
In the next phase, matches are formed between workers and ﬁrms. In order to understand the
mechanism governing this process, consider workers and ﬁrms as nodes in a bipartite network. The
applications that are sent create links between the workers and the ﬁrms. The rejection of some
applicants by the ﬁrms during the recruitment phase destroys some of these links. The matching is
now assumed to be stable on the remaining network in the Gale & Shapley (1962) sense.11 Hence,
matches form such that no ﬁrm remains unmatched while one of its qualiﬁed candidates is hired
by another ﬁrm at a lower wage or remains unemployed. If this were not true, both the ﬁrm and
the worker could do better by deviating and forming a match together. Stability can be motivated
by a process in which ﬁrms offer their job sequentially to the candidates, and workers are free to
reconsider their options.12 Ties are broken randomly.
In the last phase, production and consumption take place. Each worker-ﬁrm pair createsY units
of output, of which the worker consumes a fraction w. The ﬁrm obtains the remaining fraction
1 w of output. To let the notation be as similar as possible to the dynamic model that I introduce
in the next section, I denote the worker’s payoff given a wage w byVE (w) = w0+wY, for arbitrary
w0  0, and the ﬁrm’s payoff by VF (w) = (1 w)Y. Unemployed workers receive a payoff from
unemployed beneﬁts and/or household production. I denote this outside option by VU  0. To
prevent a collapse of the market, I impose that the surplus from a match is positive, i.e. VU <w0+Y.
10Compared to a situation in which ﬁrms can interview a deterministic number of applicants e R, the approach followed
here has a second advantage. Estimating the continuous parameter r is computationally much easier than estimating the
discrete parameter e R.
11In the Gale & Shapley (1962) model, the network is complete. This paper allows for an arbitrary level of sparseness.
12Inmoredetail: eachﬁrmrandomlyselectsoneofitsqualiﬁedapplicants, ifany, andoffershimthejob. Theapplicant
in question might get multiple offers. He compares them, tentatively accepts the best one and rejects all others. If a ﬁrm
gets rejected, it can make new job offers if it still has other qualiﬁed applicants. After this, workers again compare all
offers, potentially including the one tentatively accepted in the previous round, accept the best one for the moment and
reject all other. The process continues until no ﬁrm can make an offer anymore. All offers that are tentatively accepted
at the end of this process become matches between the worker and ﬁrm in question. This is known as the Deferred
Acceptance Process, ﬁrst described by Gale & Shapley (1962). For ﬁnite economies it converges in ﬁnite time. Since the
labor market described here contains a continuum of agents, I impose stability by assumption following Kircher (2009).
8In the next section, I derive the workers’ and ﬁrms’ optimal strategies. As standard in the
literature, I impose symmetry, i.e. identical agents have identical strategies. Further, I require the
strategies to be anonymous, in the sense that they cannot be conditioned on the identity of a speciﬁc
worker or ﬁrm.
2.2 Expected Payoffs
Consider a worker who has observed all posted contracts and has to decide where to apply. This
decision is not trivial, since the worker does not only care about the wage that he can earn at
a particular ﬁrm, but also about the probability that the ﬁrm will hire him. The worker realizes
that relatively many workers may apply to ﬁrms which post high wages or large investments in
recruitment, which implies that the matching probability at those ﬁrms will be lower. This provides
the worker an incentive to consider ﬁrms with lower wages or recruitment investments as well.
Although the worker can distinguish ﬁrms that post different contracts, the anonymity assumption
implies that the worker applies to all ﬁrms that post the same contract with equal probability. The
application strategy of the worker can therefore be written as
c = (c1;:::;cA) = ((r1;w1);:::;(rA;wA));
whereci indicatestowhatcontracttheworkersendshisi-thapplication. Itwillconvenienttoassume
- without loss of generality - that w1  :::  wA and that the worker accepts the contract with the
higher index in case of a tie. I denote the distribution of workers’ strategies by G. In other words
G(e c) denotes the probability that an unemployed worker sends his ﬁrst application to a contract
(r;w) below e c1 = (e r1; e w1), his second application to a contract below e c2, et cetera. The support of G
is denoted by G.
Let y(c) denote the endogenous probability that an application to a ﬁrm posting c = (r;w)
results in a job offer. The result of each application is independent of the result of the workers’ other
applications. Therefore, the worker’s job ﬁnding probability Y0(c), which equals the probability






A worker accepts the job offer that gives him the highest wage. Hence, he ends up in a position
paying wi if he gets a job offer from that ﬁrm and if none of the applications to higher wages
resulted in an offer. This happens with probability Õ
A
j=i+1(1 y(cj))y(ci). The worker will then
receivethevalueofemploymentatthewagewi, i.e. VE (wi), buthastogiveuphisoutsideoption, i.e.
the value of unemployment VU. Summing over all possible values i 2 f1;:::Ag gives the expected














Firms with vacancies post a contract c in order to maximize their expected payoff. Denote the
distribution of contracts by F(c), its density by f (c) and its support by F. Let h(c) denote the
hiring probability for a ﬁrm posting c, which indirectly depends on the number of ﬁrms v(c) posting





VV (c) =  kV  kR(r 1)+h(c)VF (w): (4)
The free entry condition implies that ﬁrms will continue to enter and post a contract c until the
expected payoff of this strategy becomes zero. Hence, in equilibrium we must have
VV (c)  0; (5)
and v(c)  0, with complementary slackness, for all c 2 C.
2.3 Queue Lengths
After specifying the expected payoffs, I now turn to the matching probabilities for the workers and
the ﬁrms. For this, consider a group of ﬁrms all posting same contract c and the group of workers
each sending one or more applications to these ﬁrms. The anonymity assumption implies that the
workers apply to each of the ﬁrms with equal probability. Hence, the number of applicants that a
ﬁrm faces is a random variable. If the number of workers and ﬁrms were ﬁnite, it would follow a
binomial distribution (see Albrecht et al., 2004). With a continuum of agents on both sides of the
market, as I consider here, the number of applicants per ﬁrm converges to the Poisson distribution.
This distribution can by characterized by one parameter, the queue length l (c), which equals the
ratio of the total number of applications sent and the total number of ﬁrms at a given contract c.
Before I describe the matching probabilities in the model presented here, it is instructive to
brieﬂy consider a few special cases, which already have been studied in the literature. For example,
consider a world in which all workers send one application and all ﬁrms interview one applicant.
10Then it can be shown that the queue length l (c) determines the matching probabilities for the
workers and the ﬁrms. After all, ﬁrms can be certain that their job offer will be accepted and








=l (c) (compare to e.g. Acemoglu & Shimer, 2000 and Burdett et al., 2001).
If workers start to send multiple applications, the recruitment technology of the ﬁrm becomes
more important. If ﬁrms can still only interview one applicant, recruitment frictions arise because
of congestion. A ﬁrm may offer the job to an applicant who rejects the offer because he got a
better offer somewhere else. Hence, ﬁrms do not only care about the probability to have at least one
applicant, but also about the (endogenous) probability that their job offer will get accepted. I denote




while the workers’ job offer probability still equals f
 
1 e l(c)
=l (c). This is the case analyzed
by Galenianos & Kircher (2009), which corresponds with kR !¥ (i.e. r =1) in the model presented
in this paper.
On the other hand, if kR = 0 (i.e. r ! ¥), ﬁrms can freely interview all their applicants. In
this case, recruitment frictions do not play a role. The ﬁrm may still offer the job to a worker who
rejects it because of a better offer somewhere else, but this worker does not cause congestion since
the ﬁrm can now go back to any other applicants it had. Hence, the ﬁrm will match as long as it
has at least one qualiﬁed applicant without better offers. Kircher (2009) shows that the expected
number of such applicants per ﬁrm follows a Poisson distribution with mean
m(c) = f (1 Y(c))l (c): (6)





For intermediate values of kR, ﬁrms will typically interview neither one nor all applicants. The
actual number of interviews that a ﬁrm conducts depends on its number of applicants and its in-
terview capacity, both of which are endogenous random variables. However, the following lemma
shows that a simple expression can be derived for the expected number of interviews.





Note that the expected number of interviews equals 1 e l(c) for r = 1 and converges to l (c)
for r ! ¥, exactly in line with the discussion above. If the ﬁrm interviews multiple candidates, it
may be able to make a second offer if the ﬁrst one gets rejected, provided it still has other qualiﬁed
applicants. However, if the ﬁrm runs out of qualiﬁed applicants, it will remain unmatched for the
remainder of the period, even if it still has applicants which it has not interviewed yet. Hence,
congestion caused by recruitment frictions still arises, but to a lesser extent than for kR ! ¥.
11As I will show below, the ﬁrms’ hiring probability and the workers’ job offer probability are
determined by a third queue length in this case. I denote this queue length by k(c). In order to
distinguish between the three different queue lengths, I call l (c) the gross queue length, m(c) the
net queue length, and k(c) the effective queue length.13 The effective queue length k(c) is deﬁned
as a weighted average of the gross and the net queue length, with 1
r and r 1









Note that this deﬁnition implies that k(c) = l (c) if r = 1 and k(c) ! m(c) if r ! ¥.
In order to derive expressions for the workers’ job offer probability y(c) and the ﬁrms’ hiring
probability h(c), I consider a ﬁrm posting a contract c and I assume for the moment that the gross
queue length l (c) and the net queue length m(c) are exogenously given. This also pins down the
queue length l (c) m(c) of applicants that will never match with the ﬁrm. The actual number
of applicants of each type follows a Poisson distribution. Given realizations for the number of
qualiﬁed applicants without better offers and for the number of other applicants, it is straightforward
to calculate the matching probabilities. Taking expectations then yields the following result.
Proposition 1. A ﬁrm posting c = (r;w) with gross queue length l (c), net queue length m(c), and
















By convention, h(c) = 0 and y(c) = f if k(c) = 0.
The lemma shows that the job offer probability y(c) indeed solely depends on k(c). The ﬁrm’s
hiring probability h(c) depends on k(c) and, through m(c), on the probability 1 Y(c) that its job
offer will get accepted. Hence, the matching probabilities have the same structure as in the special
cases discussed above, i.e. they only depend on r and w through the queue lengths. This similarity
in the structure is an important result. It implies that in the derivation of the equilibrium, we can
build on the insights gained by Galenianos & Kircher (2009) and Kircher (2009), which means that
the model is tractable despite its additional richness. Note further that equations (8) and (9) indeed
collapse to the special cases for r = 1 (i.e. kR ! ¥) and r ! ¥ (i.e. kR = 0).
Note that the scope of proposition 1 and lemma 1 is not limited to directed search models,
since they describes the matching technology. The applications that workers have sent during the
13Kircher (2009) calls m(c) the effective queue length, since it is the relevant notion in the world that he describes.
12application phase have created a network. The structure that is imposed implies that this network
can be fully characterized by the queue lengths. The lemma and the proposition take these variables
as given and therefore hold for other application processes, e.g. random search, as well. The
application process however matters for the equilibrium expressions for the queue lengths. For
example, under random search the gross queue length would be independent of the wage offered
by a ﬁrm. This is not the case in the directed search setting of this paper. Firms that post higher
wages or better recruitment technologies attract more applicants. Formally, the gross queue length










Gi(c) 8c 2 C; (10)
where Gi(c) denotes the marginal distribution of G with respect to ci. The right hand side denotes
the total mass of applications that are sent by the workers to contracts no higher than c. The left
hand side represents the mass of applications received by ﬁrms posting a contract no higher than c.
Both masses need to be the same for each possible c.
Equation(6)showsthatoncethegrossqueuelengthl (c)isknown, theacceptanceprobabilityis
theonlyendogenousvariablestillrequiredtocalculatethenetqueuelength m(c). Consideraworker
who gets a job offer with his i-th application. Let ˆ Gi(c i;c) denote the conditional distribution of
the remaining applications, given that the i-th application was sent to contract c. The worker will
accept the offer w if and only if all applications sent to higher wages do not result in a job offer.
This is the case with probability Õ
A
j=i+1(1 y(cj)). Finally, let ˆ P(i;w) denote the conditional










(1 y(wj))d ˆ Gi(c i;c): (11)
2.4 Equilibrium Deﬁnition and Summary
Before deﬁning the equilibrium, consider the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It is necessary to specify
the ﬁrms’ beliefs about the workers’ response to a deviation in the contract posting. In particular,
a deviating ﬁrm has to anticipate how many workers will apply, since that will affect the hiring
probability. As standard in literature, I use the market utility condition. The market utility is deﬁned
as the highest level of utility from search that an unemployed worker can achieve by following the
optimal application strategy. This is V
S , as deﬁned in equation (3). The market utility condition
postulates that workers will apply to the deviating ﬁrm in a way that provides them with exactly
the same utility as they could have obtained by applying to non-deviating ﬁrms. The intuition is
that if the deviant would provide the workers with a higher level of utility, all workers would have
13an incentive to apply to this ﬁrm, which would drive up the queue length and reduces the expected
payoff. The reverse holds if the deviant offered a lower level of utility. Hence, k(c) has to be such
that the market utility condition holds.
I now deﬁne an equilibrium as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A static equilibrium is a tuple fv;F;Gg such that there exists k() satisfying
1. Proﬁt Maximization: VV (c) =V
V  maxc0VV (c0) for all c 2 F;
2. Free Entry: V
V = 0 if v > 0 andV
V  0 if v = 0;
3. Utility Maximization: VS(c) =V
S  maxc0VS(c0) for all c 2 G.
4. Consistency: k() is consistent with equations (6) to (11) and fulﬁlls the market utility con-
dition.
The ﬁrst and third condition respectively guarantee optimal behavior by ﬁrms and workers.
Firms with vacancies choose the contract c that maximizes their discounted future payoff. Work-
ers choose the application portfolio c that maximizes their value of search. The second condition
represents free entry. Firms continue to post a certain contract until its value becomes zero. If no
ﬁrm posts a speciﬁc contract, it must be the case that the associated value is non-positive. The last
condition ensures that the effective queue length satisﬁes its requirements.
In the next subsections, I analyze the existence of an equilibrium. I start by analyzing the
worker’s optimal strategy, after which I turn to the ﬁrm’s decision problem. I derive the following
result.
Summary 1. An equilibrium exists and has the following properties: A different types of contracts
are posted; ﬁrms that post a higher wage invest less in recruitment; each worker applies exactly
once to each type of contract.
2.5 Workers’ Application Behavior
Anunemployedworkerobservesallcontractspostedbytheﬁrmsandhastodecidetowhichﬁrmshe
wishestoapply. Whenconsideringaﬁrm, theworkerisconcernedabouttwothings: thewagewthat
he can earn in the ﬁrm and the probability y(c) that the ﬁrm will hire him. Hence, while observing
the contracts, the wage is of direct interest to him, whereas he only cares about the recruitment
technology through the job offer probability. This probability is a function of the effective queue
length k(c), as shown in equation (9). Hence, everything else being equal, the worker prefers ﬁrms
with short effective queue lengths. Whether the short queue lengths are the result of only few other
14workers applying to the same ﬁrm, i.e. a low l (c), or of a good recruitment technology, i.e. a high
r, is irrelevant to the worker.14
Since workers only care about the wage and the job offer probabilities, an equilibrium relation
exists between these two variables. This relationship has to be negative, i.e. applications to ﬁrms
that offer higher wages are less likely to result in a job offer. After all, a worker would not apply to a
certain ﬁrm if he can get a higher wage with a larger probability somewhere else. So, after observing
the contracts, the worker knows in equilibrium what job offer probability is associated with each
one of them. He then chooses the application portfolio that maximizes his expected lifetime utility.










Note that this optimization problem has a recursive structure. The application to a ﬁrm of-
fering wi is only relevant if all applications to higher wage ﬁrms, i.e. the applications to wages
wi+1;:::;wA, fail to result in a job offer. This simpliﬁes the derivation of the workers’ optimal
strategy considerably. DeﬁneVa as the maximum value for the worker provided by the ﬁrst a appli-





This recursive structure provides several important insights. First, the worker’s decision where
to apply does not depend on the exact number of applications that he sends. This simpliﬁes the
implementation of heterogeneity in the number of applications. I discuss this in more detail in
section 3. Second, note that this recursive equation describes the equilibrium relationship between
the job offer probability y(c) and the wage w. Since y(c) only depends on k(c), it also deﬁnes
a relationship between k(c) and w. This implies that in equilibrium k(c) and y(c) only depend
on r through w. The intuition for this result is as follows: if two ﬁrms offer the same wage but a
different recruitment technology, then the one with the better technology is more attractive and will
receive more applications. Hence, the gross queue length l (c) will go up until workers are again
indifferent between both ﬁrms. This will be the case if the effective queue length k(c) is the same.
Now, let ¯ wi denote the highest wage that yields utilityVi if the outside option equalsVi 1, i.e.
¯ wi = supfw 2 Wjy(c)VE (w)+(1 y(c))Vi 1 =Vig 8i 2 f1;:::;Ag
Additionally, deﬁne ¯ w0 as the lowest wage that would receive applications. The following lemma
14Since r does not enter the worker’s decision problem directly, the derivation of the worker’s optimal search strategy
is analogous to the analysis in Galenianos & Kircher (2009) and Kircher (2009). I therefore keep the exposition brief and
refer to their papers for additional details. See also Chade & Smith (2006).
15states that the values ¯ wi bound the interval to which application i can be sent in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. The optimal application strategy for any worker is to send application i 2 f1;:::;Ag to
a wage in the interval Wi  [ ¯ wi 1; ¯ wi].
This lemma conﬁrms that workers do not necessarily want to send all their applications to the
ﬁrm offering the highest wage. Speciﬁcally, workers send their ﬁrst application to a low wage,
although higher wages may be offered as well. The reason is that workers also care about the
probability to be hired and a high wage implies a low job offer probability. The lemma also reveals
a second characteristic of the equilibrium. Note that the ﬁrst application provides the worker with
a value V1. The second application is sent to a wage w in the interval W2. By the deﬁnition of ¯ w1,
this application by itself provides a value that is at most V1 (if w = ¯ w1) and typically strictly less (if
w < ¯ w1). The reason why workers nevertheless want to send their second application to this interval
rather than to the interval W1 is the fact that the outside option is different. The outside option to
the ﬁrst application is the value of unemploymentVU, whereas failure of the second application still
yields V1 >VU to the worker. Because of this better safety net, the worker is willing to take more
risk with his second application, i.e. apply to a ﬁrm that offers a higher wage but a lower job offer
probability.
Since lemma 2 restricts the workers’ application behavior, it has implications for the job offer
probability y(c) and the effective queue length k(c) . For example, no worker will apply to wages
below ¯ w0. Therefore, the queue length at ﬁrms offering such wages equals 0 and the corresponding
job offer probability equals f.15 Firms posting wages in [ ¯ w0; ¯ w1] receive the ﬁrst application of each
worker. This application must yield a utilityV1 to the worker, hence the job offer probability is such
that the condition V1 = y(c)VE (w)+(1 y(c))V0 holds. In a similar manner conditions for the
remaining intervals can be derived. This is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium, the job offer probability y(c) satisﬁes the following conditions
y(c) = f 8w 2 [0; ¯ w0]; r 2 R (14)
y(c)VE (w)+(1 y(c))Vi 1 = Vi 8w 2 [ ¯ wi 1; ¯ wi]; r 2 R; i 2 f1;:::;Ag; (15)
for some tuple (V1;:::;VA),V0 =VU, ¯ w0 =V 1







. By equation (9),
the conditions (14) and (15) also determine the effective queue length k(c).
Given a vector of values (V0;:::;VA), this lemma describes the workers’ application behavior at
all possible contracts, including the ones not offered in equilibrium. This will prove to be convenient
in the derivation of the ﬁrms’ optimal strategies in the next subsection.
15A deviant applying to a ﬁrm posting a wage below ¯ w0 faces no competition from other workers and will get an offer
if he is qualiﬁed for the job.
162.6 Firms’ Contract Posting
I now analyze the strategy of a ﬁrm. Consider a tuple (V0;:::;VA) and the associated cut-off values
( ¯ w0;:::; ¯ wA 1), which by lemma 3 describe the application behavior of workers. Firms have to
decide what contract c = (r;w) to post, taking into account this application behavior as well as the
strategies followed by the other ﬁrms. The free entry condition implies that ﬁrms will continue to
choose c until the expected payoff of this choice becomes zero. Hence, in equilibrium we must have
 kV  kR(r 1)+h(c)VF (w)  0;
and v(c)  0, with complementary slackness, for all c 2 C.
Lemma 3 implies that we can distinguish between A different types of ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, I
deﬁne a ﬁrm to be of type i 2 f1;:::;Ag if it posts a wage in the interval Wi = [ ¯ wi 1; ¯ wi] and
receives the i-th application of a worker.16 In choosing its optimal strategy, a ﬁrm of type i must
take into account that a worker may reject its wage offer because he got a better offer at a different
ﬁrm. Clearly, the probability Y(c) that the worker rejects the offer is lower for higher type ﬁrms
and it is zero for the ﬁrms offering the highest wages. Moreover, by lemma 3, we know that this
probability is constant within the interval Wi, since workers send one application to a given interval
only. Individual ﬁrms take Y(c) as given, since it only depends on the behavior of workers and
higher type ﬁrms. Denote the rejection probability in interval Wi by Yi. Substituting this variable
andtheequations(6)and(7)into(8)showsthatforallwagesintheintervalWi thehiringprobability








Note that the ﬁrst factor on the right hand side is independent of the exact value of w 2 Wi, but only
depends on the recruitment technology r. On the other hand, the second factor only depends on the
contract through the effective queue length k(c).
By substituting (16) into the ﬁrm’s objective function, we can write the optimization problem









s.t. y(c)VE (w)+(1 y(c))Vi 1 =Vi;
where the constraint speciﬁes the level of utility that the ﬁrm has to provide to the workers in order
to attract applicants. This optimization problem can be solved by exploiting the fact that there exists
16Posting a wage in the interval [0; ¯ w0] does not lead to any applications and can therefore not be part of an equilibrium
strategy.
17a one-to-one relationship between the wage and the effective queue length. Each wage w provides
the ﬁrm with a certain queue length k. Rather than by choosing a wage, the ﬁrm can therefore also
solve this optimization problem by choosing an effective queue length. First, using the worker’s












which speciﬁes the wage that the ﬁrm needs to post in order to attract a certain queue k. Evaluating
the ﬁrm’s payoff function in this expression yields





Substituting this into the objective function eliminates the wage. Instead, we get an expression that












where Ki  [¯ ki 1; ¯ ki] and ¯ ki is the effective queue length that corresponds to ¯ wi:
We can now show that in equilibrium ﬁrms of different types will never offer the same wage.
As a result, wage dispersion is a fundamental characteristic of any equilibrium.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium, for all i; j 2 f1;:::;Ag, ﬁrms of type i and j 6= i do not post the same
contract. In particular, they do not post the same wage.
The fact that in equilibrium k does not directly depend on r makes it possible to maximize the
objective function over both variables independently. One can show that the objective function is
strictly concave in both k 2 Ki and r 2 R. This implies that all ﬁrms of type i choose the same
optimal queue length k
i and recruitment technology r
i , which are determined by either the solution
to the ﬁrst order conditions or the boundary values. I summarize this in the following lemma.












and the ﬁrm’s optimal recruitment technology r











18This lemma provides several important insights. First of all, note that in equilibrium exactly A
different contracts will be offered. Hence, F = fc
1;:::;c
Ag, where w
i is the wage that corresponds
to k
i . Workers will send one application to each of the A types of contracts. As the lemma shows,
ﬁrms that post low wages and are therefore likely to be rejected by applicants (i.e. Yi is large),
will buy more interview capacity than ﬁrms that offer higher wages. Hence, ﬁrms face a trade-off
between paying a high wage and investing a lot in recruitment. Further, equation (19) reveals that
ﬁrms also invest more in recruitment if only few candidates are qualiﬁed (i.e. f is small), or if the
cost per interview kR is small compared to the ﬁxed cost of opening a vacancy kV, which is in line
with intuition.
Note that ¯ k0 = 0, which implies that the optimal queue length k
1 for the lowest wage ﬁrms is
given by the interior solution log
f(VE(1) V0)
V1 V0 . In general, it is not straightforward to derive whether
the interior or the boundary solution prevails for k
i ; i 2 f2;:::;Ag. Only in special cases such a
result can be obtained. Galenianos & Kircher (2009) show that in a model with one interview per
ﬁrm (kR ! ¥), the optimal queue length equals the boundary value ¯ ki 1 for i 2 f2;:::;Ag. In a
similar model but with an unlimited number of interviews (kR = 0), the optimal queue length for a
type i ﬁrm is deﬁned by the solution to the ﬁrst order conditions, as shown by Kircher (2009). Such
a general result cannot be derived for the model presented here. Numerical simulations however
indicate that for a large range of parameter values for kR, the boundary solutions arise. Only for kR
very close to zero, the interior solution may occur.
Each optimal effective queue length k
i is associated with a gross queue length l
i and a net
queue length m
i . By combining equations (6) and (19), we can express the optimal recruitment














2.7 Equilibrium Outcome and Efﬁciency
The previous subsections have derived some important characteristics of the equilibrium. In partic-
ular, the optimal recruitment technology for a ﬁrm posting the i-th contract has been determined.
After substituting this expression into the ﬁrm’s problem, the model is isomorphic to Galenianos &
Kircher (2005, 2009). Hence, an equilibrium can be shown to exist.
Proposition 2. A static equilibrium exists. It satisﬁes the properties derived in lemma 2 to 5.
As already shown by Galenianos & Kircher (2005, 2009), it is not straightforward to prove
uniqueness of the equilibrium. Numerical simulations however indicate that the equilibrium is in
fact unique for a wide range of parameter values.
For the efﬁciency properties of the equilibrium we can also build on the insights from the exist-
































Efﬁciency properties of the equilibrium. The vertical axis shows the number of applications A that workers
send out. The horizontal axis displays the recruitment technology r of the ﬁrms. E = efﬁcient (Walrasian)
equilibrium, CE = constrained efﬁcient equilibrium, CI = constrained inefﬁcient equilibrium.
Figure 2: Efﬁciency
Summary 2. The equilibrium exhibits efﬁcient (Walrasian) exchange for A ! ¥ and kR = 0 (i.e.
r ! ¥). If A = 1, A ! ¥ or kR = 0, the equilibrium is constrained efﬁcient. For other combinations
of A and kR the equilibrium is constrained inefﬁcient.
It is well-known that standard directed search models with one application per worker are con-
strained efﬁcient in the sense that a social planner subject to the same frictions as the decentralized
market cannot increase welfare (see e.g. Moen, 1997). This changes when workers send multiple
applications. Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos & Kircher (2009) show that if ﬁrms can contact
only one applicant, the decentralized market equilibrium is not constrained efﬁcient. The inefﬁcien-
cies however disappear if A ! ¥, as follows from Julien et al. (2000) and Kaas (2010).17 Kircher
(2009) discusses that for general A constrained efﬁciency is only obtained if ﬁrms can contact all
applicants, i.e. in terms of the current model r ! ¥ or, equivalently, kR = 0.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Recall that while applying workers only care about
the effective queue length k(c) at a given ﬁrm. Hence, if a ﬁrm changes the wage it posts, workers
adjust their application behavior until the new effective queue length at the deviant is such that the
market utility condition holds. However, ﬁrms do not only care about the arrival rate of applicants,
but also about whether one of the contacted applicants accepts the job offer. The probability of
retaining a contacted worker does not depend on the number of applicants that the ﬁrm has received,
so in general the ﬁrm is not able to control both dimensions with the one pricing instrument that it
17Both papers consider a world in which ﬁrms can contact one worker only. It is however straightforward to show that
their efﬁciency results extend to environments in which multiple job offers are possible.
20has, i.e. the wage that it posts. Only in special cases such efﬁcient pricing is possible. If A = 1,
job offers will always be accepted and ﬁrms only need to focus on the arrival rate. Reversely, if
A ! ¥, the wage set by the ﬁrm plays no role in the arrival rate of applicants. Finally, if r ! ¥,
the probability to have a job offer accepted directly depends on the queue length, since the ﬁrm can
offer the job to all workers until one accepts. In terms of the model in this paper, k(c) and m(c)
coincide in that case, making efﬁcient pricing possible.18
To conclude, note that if both the recruitment technology r and the number of applications tend
to inﬁnity, i.e. r ! ¥ and A ! ¥, the Walrasian outcome is obtained, as shown by Kircher (2009).
This suggests a natural procedure to investigate the magnitude of the frictions in the model. Given
parameter values, total social surplus in the market equilibrium can be calculated. This can be
compared to the surplus generated in the Walrasian outcome. The difference is then a measure for
the loss in surplus due to the frictions. I follow this approach in section 4.6 after discussing and
estimating the dynamic version of the model.
3 Dynamic Model
In this section, I extend the simple static model of the previous subsection to a dynamic framework
that can be confronted with the data. I endogenize the workers’ values of employment and unem-
ployment, the unemployment rate u, and the workers’ search intensity. I further introduce worker
heterogeneity to avoid that too much of the wage dispersion in the data would be attributed to the
frictions.
3.1 Setting
The key elements of the model are the same as in the previous section. However, a few elements
differ. I discuss each one of them in this subsection.
First, time is discrete and continues forever. Both ﬁrms and workers maximize the sum of
expected future payoffs, discounted at rate b0 2 (0;1). Firms are inﬁnitely-lived, but an exogenous
fraction t of the workers retires at the end of each period. Retired workers have a zero payoff
forever after and are replaced by new unemployed workers in order to keep the size of the labor
force constant.19 Besides retirement, job destruction is a second source of separations. At the end
of each period, an exogenous fraction d 2 (0;1) of the matches gets dissolved. Employed workers
hit by the shock ﬂow back to unemployment. In the next period they can - like all other unemployed
workers - search for a new job. Hence, a worker who is employed in the current production phase
18See section 3.3 in Galenianos & Kircher (2009) and section VI in Kircher (2009) for a detailed discussion of this
issue.
19Retirement is important to keep the cross-sectional distribution of worker types stationary. See below for more
details.
21may be employed at a different ﬁrm in the production phase of the next period after experiencing
a very short unemployment spell. Discreteness of the data may cause this to look like a job-to-job
transition, even though the model does not allow for on-the-job search in the classic sense.20 The
labor market is assumed to be in steady state, implying that the unemployment rate at the beginning
of the production phase must satisfy
uY0 = (1 u)(d +t  dt)(1 Y0);
where Y0 denotes a worker’s matching probability.
Another new element is that the number of applications per worker is no longer exogenously
given. Instead, workers choose how many ﬁrms they wish to contact. Since optimization over a
discretevariableiscumbersome, Ichooseaspeciﬁcationthatissimilartotheonedescribedinforthe
ﬁrms’ recruitment technology.21 Unemployed workers choose a search intensity a 2 R+ which is a
measure for the time they allocate to searching a job. The search intensity determines the expected
number of applications that a worker can send. However, as with the interview capacity, there is a
stochastic element as well, e.g. because a particular application takes more or less time than initially
expected. Hence, the actual number of applications follows a certain distribution that depends on
a. I denote the fraction of workers with search intensity a that can send a 2 N0 applications by
p(aja) and the cumulative distribution function by P(aja) = å
a
i=0 p(ija). In the empirical part I
will assume a particular functional form for p(aja), but in this section I keep the analysis as general
as possible by only making three assumptions: i) ﬁrst order stochastic dominance in a to make a
interpretable as a search intensity; ii) P(1ja) < 1 for all a > 0 to generate simultaneous search;
iii) the support of the distribution is bounded to avoid an inﬁnite number of contracts. In particular,
workers send at most A applications per period, where A is a potentially large but ﬁnite integer. I
denote the equilibrium distribution of search intensities by H(a) and its support by H.
A last new feature is worker heterogeneity. While ﬁrms continue to be homogeneous, I allow
workers to differ in their human capital, which will determine the amount of output that is created
in a match. Workers enter the labor market with human capital equal to y0, which is a draw from
a distribution Fy(y) with support equal to (a subset of) (0;¥): During his life, a worker experi-
ences deterministic growth of his human capital according to yt+1 = (1+q)yt.22 I assume that
b0(1 t)(1+q) < 1.
Without further assumptions, the presence of heterogeneity among workers would render the
model intractable. The reason is that when ﬁrms face applicants with different productivity levels,
the ﬁrm’s decision problem becomes much more complex. Always interviewing the most skilled
20See Menzio & Shi (2009) for on-the-job search in a directed search model with one application per period. The
combination of simultaneous search and on-the-job search is computationally challenging.
21See also Kaas (2010) for a similar setup.
22It is important to allow for human capital growth since a Mincer equation reveals a strong inﬂuence of a worker’s
age on his wage. See section 4.2 for details.
22applicant is generally not the optimal strategy, since that implies that the competition for these
workers will be much higher than for slightly less productive workers. Instead, ﬁrms will need
to diversify and interview multiple types of applicants with positive probability, while rejecting
applicants with much lower productivity. This implies that the ﬁrm’s strategy is a function of its
total pool of applicants, which can be composed in inﬁnitely many ways.
To maintain tractability, I therefore make a few important assumptions. First, a worker’s human
capital y is public information and a different submarket exists for each type, such that workers with
different skills do not compete with each other.23 I impose this structure exogenously, but it can
be generated endogenously by assuming that ﬁrms that create a vacancy need to choose and post a
production technology that allows them to match with one speciﬁc type of workers only. I further
assume that there is a continuum of workers of each type, such that the expressions for the matching
probabilities given in proposition 1 hold in each submarket.
Finally, I assume that all relevant periodical costs and payoffs are scaled linearly by the worker’s
type. This guarantees that all Bellman equations are linear in y and therefore that the exact same
contracts ((r1;w1);:::;(rA;wA)) are posted in each submarket. Hence, the structure is as follows. In
eachsubmarket, theoutputofamatchequalstheamountofhumancapitalypossessedbytheworker.
Theﬁrm paysa fractionwof the outputto theworker andkeeps theremainder. Hence, theperiodical
payoff of the worker is wy, while the ﬁrm obtains (1 w)y. Creating a job for a highly productive
worker is more costly than creating a job for a low-skilled worker, such that a ﬁrm opening a
vacancy in submarket y incurs an entry cost kVy. Likewise, the recruitment cost equals kR(r 1)y.
Unemployed workers receive a payoff from household production and/or unemployment beneﬁts
equal to hy, where h 2 (0;1), and incur a search cost kAay.
3.2 Payoffs
In the static model, the workers’ and ﬁrms’ payoff functions from being matched were taken as
exogenous. In this section I endogenize them by deriving Bellman equations. The assumption that
all costs and payoffs, as well as the change in human capital, are proportional to y implies that
the Bellman equations are proportional to y as well. To simplify notation, I therefore specify the
Bellman equations in efﬁciency units, i.e. per unit of y.
Consider ﬁrst a worker’s value VE (w) of being employed at a wage w at the beginning of the
production stage. The worker will have a periodical payoff equal to his wage. At the end of this
period, he will lose his job without retiring with probability d (1 t). In that case he will be
searching for a new job at the beginning of the next period and receive his value of search (1+q)VS,
which I derive below. If the match does not get dissolved, the worker obtains (1+q)VE (w). Hence,
23See van den Berg & Ridder (1998) for a similar approach.
23the the worker’s value function satisﬁes the following Bellman equation
VE (w) = w+b ((1 d)VE (w)+dVS);
where b = b0(1 t)(1+q). Note that VE (w) indeed satisﬁes the linear structure assumed in the
previous section, withY = 1
1 b(1 d) and w0 =
bdVS
1 b(1 d).
Next, consider the search decision of a worker looking for a job. In the previous section, the
optimal application portfolio was derived for an exogenous number of applications A. Now, workers
jointly choose their search intensity a and the optimal application portfolio c, which results in an
equilibrium distribution of workers’ strategies J(a;c) with support J. The recursive structure (13)
of the application problem however implies that an individual worker’s choice of which jobs to
apply to, i.e. his choice of c, is independent of his choice of search intensity a. Hence, we can
write J(a;c) = G(c)H(a) with J = G H. Consequently, the workers’ value of search can can
now be calculated by conditioning on the number of applications a ﬁrst and subsequently taking the

















Using this, we can now derive the Bellman equation for the workers’ value of unemployment.
During the production phase an unemployed worker receives a payoff h. In the next period, he
obtains the value of search (1+q)VS if he does not retire. Hence,
VU = h+bVS:
Next, I turn to the ﬁrm’s Bellman equations. A ﬁrm employing a worker at a wage w obtains a
periodical payoff 1 w. The match between the worker and the ﬁrm continues in the next period












(1 P(i 1ja))Gi(c)dH(a) 8c 2 C; (100)

















d ˆ Gi(c i;c); (110)
where P(a;i;w) denotes the conditional probability that the worker who got the offer w sent there his i-th out of a
applications.
24if no job destruction shock or retirement takes place. Otherwise, the ﬁrm obtains the value of a
vacancy, which in equilibrium equals zero due to free entry. Therefore,
VF (w) = 1 w+b (1 d)VF (w);
which is consistent with the speciﬁcationVF (w) = (1 w)Y of the previous section. Finally, a ﬁrm
with a vacancy posting a contract c, gets a payoffVV (c) as speciﬁed in equation (4).
3.3 Equilibrium
The updated equilibrium deﬁnition is as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. A dynamic equilibrium is a tuple fu;v;F;G;Hg such that there exists k() satisfying
1. Proﬁt Maximization: VV (c) =V
V  maxc0VV (c0) for all c 2 F;
2. Free Entry: V
V = 0 if v > 0 andV
V  0 if v = 0;
3. Utility Maximization: VS(a;c) =V
S  maxa0;c0VS(a0;c0) for all c 2 G and a 2 H.
4. Consistency: k() is consistent with equations (6) to (9), (100) and (110), and fulﬁlls the
market utility condition.


















The ﬁrst two conditions concern the ﬁrm’s behavior and are the same as for the static equilib-
rium. The utility maximization condition now includes the choice of search intensity. The fourth
condition guarantees consistency of k() with the updated deﬁnitions of l (c) and Y(c). The last
condition equates the number of workers entering and leaving unemployment.
It is straightforward to see that the new model elements introduced in this section do not fun-
damentally change the structure of the equilibrium. Even though the current framework is dynamic
and contains worker heterogeneity, workers and ﬁrms in each submarket solve the static model of
the previous section period by period. The equilibrium properties derived in the static version held
for anyVE (),VU, and u, so they continue to hold for the endogenized versions of these objects. The
following corollary summarizes this.
Corollary 1. In any dynamic equilibrium, lemma 2 to 5 hold.
Hence, the heterogeneity in the number of applications per worker change the exact equilibrium
contracts that are offered and the number of agents trading at each of the contracts, but do not
25change the fact that i) still A different contracts are offered; ii) workers applying A times send one
application to each type of contract; and iii) unemployed who send a < A applications, apply to the







The solution to this optimization problem is unique if VS(a) is strictly concave in a. Note that













da2 (Vi Vi 1) < 0:
In that case, all workers choose the same level of search intensity, as determined by the ﬁrst order
condition of the optimization problem. Because of the boundedness of VS(a) concavity holds for
sufﬁciently large a. However, in general it is not obvious that the second derivative is strictly
negative for all a. In particular, it may be positive for low values of a, as pointed out by Kaas
(2010) in a similar setting. In that case, the equilibrium may require that the workers mix between
a =0 and the a implied by the ﬁrst order condition. Since the sign of the second derivative depends
on the endogenous objectsVi, it is not obvious which distribution functions give strict concavity. In
the empirical part, I will therefore choose a particular distribution, assume that the condition is
satisﬁed in the equilibrium calculation, and verify this assumption ex post.
Endogenous search intensity may be a source of multiplicity of the equilibrium. For example, if
the cost of search kA is low, workers will typically apply a lot. This forces ﬁrms to offer high wages,
which may provide workers with an incentive to indeed send many applications. The reverse holds
if the cost of an application is high. Such multiplicity is a potential problem in the estimation. I
solve this by estimating the search intensity a rather than the search cost kA, as I will explain in
section 4.4.
To complete the description of the equilibrium, consider the unemployment rate u. Using the
intermediate value theorem, it is straightforward to check that given the workers’ and ﬁrms’ optimal
strategies, there is a unique value of u that satisﬁes the ﬁfth condition of the equilibrium deﬁnition
above. With this result, one can now proof the existence of a dynamic equilibrium.
Proposition 3. A dynamic equilibrium exists. It satisﬁes the properties derived in lemma 2 to 5.
264 Estimation
4.1 Data
The model discussed above has implications for several key variables at the ﬁrm level. For given
parameter values, it determines - in expectation - 1) the number of applicants that a ﬁrm has, 2)
the number of interviews that the ﬁrm conducts, 3) the number of job offers that the ﬁrm makes,
4) the wage that the ﬁrm pays, 5) the amount of time that the ﬁrm spends on screening and 6)
the ﬁrm’s vacancy duration. Unfortunately, the availability of microdata containing information on
each of these variables is very limited. To my knowledge, the only exception is the Employment
Opportunities Pilot Projects (EOPP) data set, which I therefore use in this paper. It contains the
information from a two-wave longitudinal survey that was designed to evaluate the impact of US
labor market programs developed by the Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation and
Research, and funded by the Department of State’s Employment and Training Administration.25
TheEmploymentOpportunitiesPilotProjectwasintroducedinthesummerof1979. Itconsisted
of an intensive job search program combined with a work and training program, organized at 10
pilots sites throughout the country. Each pilot site consisted of a small number of neighboring
counties. The program was aimed at unemployed workers with a low family income, and tried to
place eligible workers in private-market jobs at one of the pilot sites during a job search assistance
program. If these attempts failed, the worker was offered a federally-assisted work or training
position. The program was in full operation by the summer of 1980, but was phased out during
1981 by the new Administration.
In order to evaluate the program, a survey was sent to ﬁrms at the ten pilot sites and twenty
control sites which where selected on the basis of their similarity to the pilot sites. Table 1 lists all
sites included in the ﬁnal data set.26 The ﬁrst wave of the survey took place between March and June
1980. The second wave was conducted between February and July 1982 and aimed to re-interview
all respondents to the ﬁrst survey. The response rate was about 70%.
The data set is not representative for the US labor market as a whole. Workers in the sample
are relatively young and due to the nature of the labor market program, low incomes are overrep-
resented.27 Moreover, the pilot sites are disproportionally concentrated in Gulf Coast cities and
underrepresent cities in the Northeast of the US. Further, the data set does not include workers in
25Several other authors have used the EOPP data set, e.g. Barron et al. (1985), Barron et al. (1987), and Burdett &
Cunningham (1998). See these papers for additional information about the survey. The papers are different from mine in
the sense that they do not use a two-sided equilibrium search model to analyze the data.
26A few sites were excluded from the ﬁnal data set for various exogenous reasons.
27Note that this is not a concern if we want to study the effect of frictions on the desirability of active labor market pro-
grams. These programs are often targeted at unemployed workers, among which young, low wage workers are typically
overrepresented as well. Nevertheless, it would certainly be interesting to estimate the model on a more representative
sample of workers or on data from speciﬁc, well-deﬁned submarkets, like e.g. the job market for economists, once the
data is available. For future research in this area, surveys like the one conducted Hall & Krueger (2008) could be an
important source of information.
27government and non-proﬁt organizations. The probability for a ﬁrm in one of the sites to be in-
cluded in the survey depended on its size and location and varied between 0.006 for the smallest
establishments to close to 1 for establishments with more than 200 employees (see Barron et al.,
1985, for more details). The data set contains sample weights to account for the heterogeneity in
the sampling probability.
The survey sent to the ﬁrms included various questions on the recruitment process for the last
hired worker. The second survey was a lot more comprehensive than the ﬁrst one. In particular,
the ﬁrst survey did not include a question on the number of applicants per vacancy. For this reason,
I only utilize the 1982 data in this paper. This data set contains information on all six variables
listed above for the ﬁrm’s most recent hire, conditional on the hiring taking place between January
1980 and September 1981.28 Further, the data set contains a number of worker characteristics, like
gender, age, education level, sector, location, and occupation.29 I use these variables to control for
productivity differences, as I explain in more detail in the next subsection.
Hence, each observation in the data is a tuple (zA;zI;zO;zW;zT;zV;x), respectively denoting 1)
the number of applicants zA at a given ﬁrm, 2) the number of interviews zI the ﬁrm conducted, 3) the
number of job offers zO it made, 4) the wage zW it paid to the worker it hired, 5) the amount of time
zT that the ﬁrm spent screening applicants, 6) the time zV that elapsed between posting and ﬁlling
the vacancy, and 7) the characteristics x of the worker. I restrict the sample by selecting workers who
are 18 years or older and by omitting observations with missing or unreliable values.30 Information
on the number of applicants, interviews and job offers is missing much more often than information
on the wages and the worker characteristics.31 I therefore create two samples: a large sample with
2156 observations which I will use to control for worker heterogeneity in the next subsection, and a
smaller subset with 640 observations which I will use for the estimation of the frictional model.
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics for both samples.32 The table shows that there is
considerable variation in the number of applicants and the number of interviews per ﬁrm. The
variation in the number of job offers is somewhat smaller: most ﬁrms only need to make one job
offer to hire a worker. Firms spend on average about 6 hours on screening workers and ﬁll vacancies
28The data set contains information on both the last subsidized and the last non-subsidized hire. I restrict the sample
to the latter group.
29Although sometimes seen as job characteristics, I choose to interpret the last three variables as worker characteris-
tics. Workers have a choice regarding the sector, the region and the occupation in which they work, hence their choice
contains information about their productivity. The sector is coded according to the SIC 1972 (4 digits) and occupations
are coded according to the DOT 1977. I use the ﬁrst digit of both.
30I omit outliers (top 0.5% of the distribution) in the number of applications, interviews and job offers. This does not
affect the results.
31The data set includes two wage variables. The ﬁrst one reports the wage of the individual at the survey date, but is
by deﬁnition only available if the workers is still employed at the ﬁrm. The second wage variable, which reports the wage
that the ﬁrm would offer to a new hire in the same position at the moment of the survey. Conditional on observing both,
the correlation between the two variables is more than 90%. I choose the second variable since it is observed more often
and because it excludes the inﬂuence of wage increases since the moment of hiring.
32Section 4.5 presents some histograms of the data, while discussing the goodness of ﬁt of the model.
28relatively quickly. The average vacancy duration is 17 days and about 90% of the ﬁrms ﬁnd a worker
within a month.
4.2 Worker Heterogeneity
The data does not directly report the workers’ level of human capital. I therefore assume that each









in the following way
logy = g0+x0g +eW;
where g0 is a constant and g is a vector of coefﬁcients common to all workers.33 In the estimation,
x will include the worker’s gender, his age, his education level, as well as indicators for the sector,
the location and the type of occupation.
As described in the previous section, y is assumed to be public knowledge to all agents in the
model. Hence, the realization of eW is unknown to the econometrician, but known by all workers
and ﬁrms. Given this structure, a worker with human capital y who matches with a ﬁrm posting
(rj;wj) gets a wage equal to zW = wjy. Hence, it must hold that
logzW = logwj +logy
= logwj +g0+x0g +eW: (21)
Equation (21) is a standard Mincer equation, augmented with the term logwj, which captures
the worker’s success in the matching process. This term depends on the parameters of the frictional
model, but only serves as the intercept in the equation and is orthogonal to x. The coefﬁcients g can
therefore be estimated directly by regressing logzW on x and a constant. Subsequently, the residuals
zR =logzW  x0b g can be calculated and can be used to estimate g0 and the variance s2
W of the random
productivity component along with the other parameters of the frictional model, as I will do in the
next subsection.34
I present the results of the productivity regression in table 2. The estimates for g are very much
in line with what is commonly found in this type of Mincer regressions. The wage is increasing
in the education level and is higher for men than for women. Age has a statistically signiﬁcant but
quantitatively limited effect on the wage. The estimated coefﬁcient corresponds to an annual growth
33Setting the mean of eW equal to  
s2
W
2 guarantees that the measurement error does not distort the mean of the human
capital, i.e. E[y] = exp(g0+x0g). Estimating the model with E[ew] = 0 does not yield different results.
34The equilibrium in the frictional model actually depends on g through the coefﬁcient for age. However, in the
estimation of the frictional model I will exogenously ﬁx b after which the dependence disappears. See the next subsection
for details. The sequential approach also yields larger standard errors for b g than joint estimation, but since the productivity
coefﬁcients g are not the main parameters of interest the computational advantage of a sequential approach outweighs the
loss in precision. The estimation of the frictional model is unaffected.
29Variable Mean Std.dev. Variable Mean
Recruitment variables Education
Number of applicants 14.06 22.66 Grade school 0.019
Number of interviews 4.97 6.80 Some high school 0.136
Number of offers 1.20 0.60 High school 0.543
Wage 4.11 1.60 Some college 0.169
Hours of screening 6.16 7.48 College 0.056
Vacancy duration 17.48 27.03 Other education 0.076
Age Location
Age 26.74 9.31 Columbus, OH 0.079
Corpus Christi, TX 0.052
Gender Baton Rouge, LA 0.038
Male 0.519 Mobile, AL 0.044
Female 0.481 Pike, KY 0.005
Weld, CO 0.014
Sector Marathon, WI 0.019
Extraction 0.014 Balance of state, WA 0.019
Construction 0.109 Balance of state, MO 0.011
Manufacturing 0.076 Toledo, OH 0.055
Transport 0.056 Cincinnati, OH 0.076
Wholesale 0.121 San Antonio, TX 0.117
Retail 0.277 Beaumont/Port Arthur, TX 0.027
Financial 0.084 Birmingham, AL 0.100
Service 0.263 Buchanan/Dickenson, VA 0.003
Alamosa, CO 0.024
Occupation Outagamie, WI 0.027
Prof. / Techn. / Managerial 0.059 Skagit/Whatcom, WA 0.024
Clerical / Sales 0.460 St. Francoise, MO 0.015
Service 0.128 New Orleans, LA 0.052
Agricultural 0.005 Lake Charles/Lafayette, LA 0.038
Processing 0.018 Pensacola, FL 0.024
Machine trades 0.081 Harlan, KY 0.004
Benchwork 0.028 Logan/El Paso, CO 0.034
Structural work 0.112 Winnebago, WI 0.022
Miscellaneous 0.111 Skamania, WA 0.014
Grundy, MO 0.007
Dayton, OH 0.059
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation. The values for the number of
applicants, interviews and offers are based on 640 observations. For all other variables the
sample size is 2156 observations. Wages are measured in 1982 dollars. 1 dollar in 1982 has the
same buying power as $2.22 in 2009 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Age and experience
are measured in years. The gender, education, sector, occupation, and location variables are
binary.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
30in human capital of about 0.66%. The relatively high coefﬁcients for the extraction and construction
industry are present in the raw data as well and is most likely the result of the speciﬁc sample of
workers being selected. Some modest regional variation in human capital exists.
4.3 Parametrization
Despite its richness along several dimensions, the EOPP data does not contain sufﬁcient information
for non-parametric identiﬁcation of all elements of the model. I will therefore choose some param-
eter values and functional forms exogenously. I describe these assumptions in this subsection.
Application Distribution. With respect to the number of applications, I assume a truncated Poisson
distribution with the search intensity a as its parameter. Hence, the fraction of workers p(a) that










i! for a = A;
where A is a ﬁnite integer and a > 0. Note that if a ! 0, all workers send zero applications. On the
other hand, if a ! ¥, all workers apply A times. The distribution converges to a regular Poisson
distribution for A ! ¥. The theoretical analysis in the previous sections shows that calculation
of the equilibrium requires solving for A different wage levels. In order to avoid dimensionality
problems, I will set A equal to 15 in the estimation.
A Poisson distribution is a natural choice, since it is the discrete time equivalent of the Pois-
son process typically used in continuous time models. Further, it has the attractive feature that it
has discrete support while depending on a continuous parameter. Estimation of such a continuous
parameter is signiﬁcantly less cumbersome than estimating a discrete number of applications. As
mentioned before, endogenous search intensity may be a source of multiplicity of the equilibrium.
In order to avoid problems with the estimation, I therefore do not estimate the search cost kA di-
rectly, but I treat the search intensity a as a parameter and estimate that instead. The search cost can
then be calculated ex post by equating it to the marginal beneﬁt of an extra unit of search intensity.
Period Length. In theory, the data contains some information on the length of a period. To see this,
suppose that the number of applications that workers send is deterministic. Then, compare a period
of one week in which workers send one application to a period of two weeks in which workers
send two applications. In both cases, the gross queue length l is the same given a ﬁxed number of
vacancies, but other equilibrium outcomes are very different. In the ﬁrst case, no congestion occurs,
so ﬁrms have less incentive to interview many candidates. Moreover, no wage dispersion will be
present in the data after controlling for observed and unobserved productivity differences. This is all
not true in the second case. However, identiﬁcation along these dimensions cannot be established
31Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err.
Demographics Location
Male 0.165 0.023 Corpus Christi, TX -0.004 0.038
Age 0.007 0.001 Baton Rouge, LA 0.017 0.042
Mobile, AL -0.036 0.047
Education Pike, KY 0.073 0.071
Some high school -0.092 0.105 Weld, CO -0.049 0.053
High school 0.022 0.104 Marathon, WI 0.168 0.079
Some college 0.077 0.107 Balance of state, WA 0.124 0.049
College 0.199 0.114 Balance of state, MO -0.036 0.040
Other education 0.037 0.109 Toledo, OH 0.083 0.075
Cincinnati, OH 0.050 0.048
Sector San Antonio, TX -0.052 0.050
Extraction 0.348 0.053 Beaumont/Port Arthur, TX 0.049 0.071
Construction 0.186 0.050 Birmingham, AL 0.028 0.043
Manufacturing 0.103 0.043 Buchanan/Dickenson, VA 0.119 0.076
Transport 0.038 0.047 Alamosa, CO 0.015 0.068
Wholesale -0.003 0.034 Outagamie, WI 0.013 0.047
Retail -0.100 0.026 Skagit/Whatcom, WA 0.172 0.055
Financial 0.080 0.042 St. Francoise, MO -0.025 0.073
New Orleans, LA 0.129 0.051
Occupation Lake Charles/Lafayette, LA 0.110 0.073
Clerical/sales -0.089 0.051 Pensacola, FL -0.172 0.058
Service -0.239 0.059 Harlan, KY -0.073 0.067
Agricultural -0.239 0.137 Logan/El Paso, CO -0.128 0.055
Processing -0.058 0.099 Winnebago, WI -0.025 0.056
Machine trades -0.125 0.068 Skamania, WA 0.160 0.070
Benchwork -0.119 0.071 Grundy, MO -0.046 0.051
Structural work -0.047 0.067 Dayton, OH 0.016 0.041
Miscellaneous -0.123 0.059
Statistics
Constant Number of observations 2156
Constant 1.143 0.130 R2 0.396
Results of the productivity regression. Age is measured in years. The gender, education, sector
andlabormarketvariablesaredummies. Thereferencecategoryisfemale, gradeschool, service
sector, professional/technical/managerial occupations, and Columbus, OH.
Table 2: Regression results
32easily and would be very indirect at best. Therefore, I leave this issue for further research and follow
the standard practice in the literature by ﬁxing the length exogenously to one month.
Discounting and Retirement. I exogenously ﬁx the retirement probability at 2.5% per year, i.e.
t = 0:0021, which corresponds to an average career of 40 years. Further, I set b equal to 0:931=12.
Given the assumed retirement probability and the human capital growth rate estimated in section
4.2, this value is consistent with an annual discount rate b0 of 0.948.
Job Destruction. In order to determine the job destruction probability, I use an approach similar to
Shimer (2005, 2007), taking into account the new elements of my model. Recall that unemployment
evolves according to
ut+1 = ut (1 Y0;t+1)+us
t+1;
where us
t+1  (1 ut)(dt +t  dtt)(1 Y0;t+1) denotes the number of short-term unemployed
workers at time t +1, i.e. the number of workers who were not unemployed yet at time t. Us-
ing data from the Current Population Survey, Shimer (2005, 2007) constructs time series for both ut
and us





















After averaging over the relevant time interval and taking into account the age structure of the
sample, I ﬁnd d = 0:063.35
Vacancy Creation. The vacancy creation cost kV affects several equilibrium outcomes. First, a
higher value will imply that a lower number of vacancies will be opened in the market. Unfor-
tunately however, no precise information on the number of vacancies in the US around 1980 is
available. Davis et al. (2009) create a times series by detrending the Conference Board’s Help-
Wanted Index using an HP ﬁlter, and rescale the deviations such that they match the mean of the
more direct measure of the vacancy rate in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) in
35It is important to stress that d cannot directly be compared to the estimates for the ‘employment-exit probability’
by Shimer (2007). First, d only implies a transition from employment to the pool of workers who will search for a job
in the next period. Unemployment only follows in case that search fails, i.e. with probability 1 Y0. Second, Shimer
(2007) needs to control for time aggregation because he uses a continuous-time model. Here such a correction is not
necessary since the period length in my model corresponds to the frequency of the data (1 month). Finally, I control for
the age structure by calculating d for seven different age cohorts and averaging over them using the corresponding sample
fractions. Ideally, one would control for other sample characteristics (education, location, occupation) in a similar way,
but such data is hard to obtain.
33the overlapping period (2001 - 2007). This gives vacancy rates of close to 3% for the relevant time
period. However, my deﬁnition of a vacancy is most likely wider than the one in the Help-Wanted
Index or JOLTS, since in my model any match requires a preceding vacancy. I therefore determine
kV through its effect on the worker’s matching probability Y0. With fewer vacancies available, it
will be harder for workers to ﬁnd a job. An estimate for the workers’ matching probability can be
obtained with equation (22), which yields 0:413. In the estimation of the model, I will constrain kV
such that the matching probability implied by the model equals this value.
Note that the values of t, d and Y0 jointly imply a steady state unemployment rate of u=0:084.
This is close to the value observed in the data, i.e. 0.082, meaning that the steady assumption is
reasonable despite the recessive state of the US economy in 1980 and 1981. Note further that the
values imply that in each period a fraction u+(1 u)(d +t  dt) = 0:144 of the labor force is
searching for a new job. A fraction (d +t  dt)Y0 = 0:027 of the employed workers move from
one job to another without intermittent unemployment spell. This is in consistent with estimates
of monthly job-to-job transition rates by e.g. Fallick & Fleischman (2004), Nagypal (2008) and
Moscarini & Thomsson (2007) which range from 2.2% to 3.2%. The number of matches in each
period is equal to (u+(1 u)(d +t  dt))Y0 = 0:059, indicating that JOLTS indeed does not
fully capture the equivalent of a vacancy in my model.
4.4 Estimation Strategy
After making the above assumptions, several parameters remain, including the search cost kA and
the interview cost kR. In this subsection, I will discuss how I use maximum likelihood to obtain
estimates for these parameters. The analysis in section 2 shows that in equilibrium we can distin-
guish between A different ﬁrms types in each submarket, each associated with a speciﬁc wage wj
and recruitment technology rj, j 2 f1;:::;Ag. The data does not tell us the type of a certain ﬁrm.
The likelihood of an observation therefore needs to be calculated by initially conditioning on each
possible type and subsequently taking the expectation with respect to the type. Note further that a
ﬁrm is only included in the data set if it manages to match with a worker. This creates a selection
issue: ﬁrms with many applicants or ﬁrms with a high acceptance probability are more likely to be
observed. Hence, the likelihood also needs to be conditioned on the hiring probability hj of a ﬁrm.
I now discuss each element of an observation separately.
Applicants. A ﬁrm of type j faces a number of applicants that is the realization of a Poisson distribu-
tion. The mean is equal to the ﬁrm’s gross queue length lj, which is determined in equilibrium by its




For the labor market as a whole, the number of applications received by the ﬁrms has to equal
the number of applications that are sent by the workers. The latter ﬁgure depends on the number of
searchers, which I ﬁxed, and the distribution of applications P(aja). Hence, the data on zA identiﬁes
34a.
Interviews. The number of interviews that a ﬁrm conducts depends on its number of applicants and
its interview capacity. If we observe that the number of interviews zI is strictly smaller than the
number of applicants zA; it follows that the number of interviews was restricted by the capacity. The
capacity follows a geometric distribution with mean rj, hence the probability that the ﬁrm has a








. In case we observe that the ﬁrm interviews all applicants (i.e.














, where IfzI < zAg
is an indicator function which equals 1 if the condition zI < zA is satisﬁed and 0 otherwise. A
high value for zI is more likely when rj is high. Hence, zI contains information on rj. Note that
rj depends on kR, kV, f and Yj. Since kV is determined by the number of vacancies, and Yj is
determined by the structure of the equilibrium, zI identiﬁes kR for a given value of f. Speciﬁcally, a
higher value of kR leads to fewer interviews.
Job Offers. The number of job offers that a ﬁrm needs to make in order to attract a worker follows
a geometric distribution as well. The probability of success (i.e. the worker accepts the offer)
is 1 Yj. However, acceptance needs to occur before the ﬁrm runs out of qualiﬁed applicants.
The conditional probability that the ﬁrm hires with the zO-th offer and had zO  q  zI qualiﬁed










Wage. The variance s2
W of the unobserved productivity component follows from the wage residuals.
Note that if a residual zR is observed for a worker who is employed at a type j ﬁrm, the worker’s
unobserved productivity component must equal b eW;j = zR g0 logwj, where g0 is a constant to be
estimated. The likelihood of this is given by the normal density fe (b eW;j). Given the other parame-
ters, the equilibrium wage rates (w
1;:::;w
A) are ﬁxed. We do not observe which of these wage rates
the worker earns, but after conditioning on each possible value and averaging, the identiﬁcation of
sW is standard.
Screening Time. The cost of recruitment as implied by the model equals kR(rj  1) for a ﬁrm of
type j. In order to convert this to time, I assume that a ﬁrm-worker pair produces output during
2000 hours a year, which corresponds to 50 weeks of 5 days of 8 hours. Note that if ﬁrms behave
according to the model, only A = 15 different values would be observed for the variable zT. I
attribute the excess variation in the data to measurement error. Hence, I assume that when a ﬁrm
chooses a recruitment technology r, its reported screening time zT satisﬁes
logzT = logkR(r 1)+eT;








. Hence, the likelihood contribution of an observation zT equals fe (b eT;j)
where b eT;j = logzT  logkR(r 1) and the variation in b eT;j helps to identify sT.
Note that not only the variation, but also the level of the observed screening times is informative
of the parameters of the model. How much time ﬁrms are willing to spend on recruitment depends
on the surplus from a match. This surplus is smaller for higher values of the household production
h, since ﬁrms are forced to pay higher wages in that case. The observations zT therefore contain
information on h.
Vacancy Durations. The last remaining parameter is the probability f that an interviewed candidate
is found to be qualiﬁed. The data from the current period does not identify this probability, since the
number of qualiﬁed applicants is unobserved and since each observation is conditional on match-
ing. Fortunately, an estimate for f can be obtained by using the information on vacancy durations.
Assuming that ﬁrms keep their vacancy open until it is ﬁlled and post the same contract throughout,
the model implies that vacancy durations follow a geometric distribution with parameter equal to
the periodical hiring probability hj, which is increasing in f. In order to make the data consistent
with the model, I group the observed vacancy durations into bins of 30 days, i.e. the assumed period
length. Hence, b zV = i iff zV 2 (30(i 1);30i]. The probability to observe a vacancy duration of b zV
periods conditional on matching in the current period, then equals LV;j(b zV) = (1 hj)
b zV 1.









where vj denotes the measure of ﬁrms of type j. I maximize the log of this likelihood, summed over
all observations. The standard errors are calculated with the delta method from the inverse of the
Hessian.
4.5 Estimation Results
The results of the estimation are presented in table 3 and ﬁgure 3. Panel 1 of ﬁgure 3 displays the
contracts (r;w) that are posted in equilibrium. There is contract dispersion and, in line with the
theory, I ﬁnd that that ﬁrms that post higher wages invest less in recruitment.
The second panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the density of the posted wages. It is worth noting that
this density is downward sloping, in contrast to what is obtained in estimations of the Burdett &
Mortensen (1998) model. The distribution of the wages earned by employed workers is not shown,
butitisvirtuallyidenticaltothedistributionofthepostedwages, sinceallﬁrmsmatchwithprobabil-
ity close to 1, as can been seen in the last panel. Note further that the estimated amount of frictional
36wage dispersion is small. Multiple causes underlie this result. First, limited wage dispersion is a
standard ﬁnding in well calibrated search models of the labor market, as shown by Hornstein et al.
(2010).36 Second, I limit the amount of dispersion by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in
human capital in a very ﬂexible way. The model attributes a large part of the remaining variation
in the wages after controlling for worker characteristics to the unobserved productivity component
e rather than to frictions: I ﬁnd sW = 0.233. Third, I obtain a high estimate for the value of home
production, which restricts the amount of wage dispersion that can arise. To be precise, I get h =
0.950. This is roughly in line with the value that Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) ﬁnd in their calibra-
tion, but higher than the value used by Shimer (2005) (0.40) or the value found by Hall & Milgrom
(2008) (0.71).
The mechanism behind this result is the following. I ﬁnd that screening is not very costly.
An extra unit of interview capacity requires an additional investment of kR = 0.012 (i.e. 1.2% of
monthly production), which corresponds to 1.97 hours of output or, equivalently, 2% of the vacancy
creation cost kV = 0.529. Nevertheless, ﬁrms interview only a few candidates. The average ﬁrm
chooses r = 4.091, which implies that the total cost of recruitment amounts to only 6.09 hours
of production. For this to be optimal behavior, a ﬁrm’s payoff from a match cannot be too large,
implying that the outside option of the workers must be quite high. Recall also that I use data from a
sample of relatively low-skilled workers during a recession in the US labor market. Hence, a small
gap between labor productivity and productivity at home is not unreasonable.
Despite the small amount of wage dispersion, workers are not indifferent between the different
contracts. In particular, the job offer probability varies considerably across ﬁrms, with applications
to the lowest wage ﬁrms being almost four times as likely to result in an offer as applications to
the highest wage ﬁrms. Workers send on average 4.852 applications. In order to determine the cost
of an application, we ﬁrst need to verify that the gains from search as deﬁned in equation (20) are
strictly concave in a. Figure 4 shows that this is indeed the case: the marginal beneﬁts V0
S(a) are
downward sloping. This implies that all workers choose their search intensity by equating marginal
beneﬁt to marginal cost. Hence, the marginal cost kA of an extra unit of search intensity equals
0.004. This is equivalent to 0.73 hours of household production. The total time spent on search by
an unemployed worker amounts to 3.56 hours per month, which is a bit lower than other estimates in
the literature.37 Recall that a worker matches with probability 0.413, as was imposed exogenously
to aid the identiﬁcation of the model.
The average ﬁrm hires with probability 0.911, which is well in line with the fraction of ﬁrms
36The exact magnitude of frictional wage dispersion is still an open question in the literature, which I do not aim to
answer here. Different assumptions about productivity and wages can of course be made. For example, adding on-the-job
search would probably help in generating more wage dispersion, but is left for future research because of the associated
computational complexities. However, it is important to stress that changing the model along such dimensions has a
limited effect on the estimates for its key parameters since wage data is not the main source of their identiﬁcation.
37For example, Krueger & Mueller (2008) ﬁnd a value of 16 hours per month using data from the American Time Use













Estimation results obtained with maximum likelihood.
Table 3: Estimation results
in the data that ﬁll their vacancy within a month. Correspondingly, I ﬁnd that the probability f
that a worker is qualiﬁed equals 0.887. This high value is consistent with the fact that ﬁrms match
with large probability, even though they interview relatively few applicants. Finally, the standard
deviation of the measurement error in the screening time is estimated at 1.123.
In order to consider the ﬁt of the model, I use the estimated parameter values to simulate data for
each of the dependent variables. Figure 5 displays the densities of the simulated data together with
those of the actual data. It shows that in general the model matches the data quite well. The ﬁt of the
number of job offers and the vacancy durations is particularly good. For the applicants, interviews
and screening time, the model has some difﬁculties ﬁtting the large amount of dispersion present
in the data. It predicts too few very low and very high values. However, the ﬁt is generally good
around the median in each case. For the unobserved wage component log(w)+e, the model slightly
underestimates the height of the mode. Note that the graph conﬁrms that once the unobserved
productivity component e is taken into account the amount of wage dispersion implied by the model
is not smaller than in the data.
4.6 Magnitude of Frictions
The estimation results indicate that both sending applications and conducting job interviews are
costly activities. This means that both search and recruitment frictions arise, causing the external-
ities described above. I analyze the magnitude of these frictions by considering the effect of an
exogenous change in the search cost kA and/or recruitment cost kR on social surplus. Because of the
efﬁciency unit assumption, a change in one of the parameters will change the equilibrium in any





























































































































































Equilibrium outcomes. The panels display (numbered from left to right, top to bottom): 1)
Equilibrium contracts (r;w) posted in equilibrium; 2) Fraction of ﬁrms posting a certain wage;
3) Density of the number of applications sent by workers; 4) Queue lengths l (black circles),
m (maroon diamonds) and k (orange squares) as a function of the wage; 5) Workers’ job offer
probability as a function of the wage; 6) Firms’ hiring probability as a function of the wage.
The dashed lines connecting the dots serve illustrative purposes only.
Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes














































The maroon solid line represents the marginal beneﬁts of search for an individual worker, given
equilibrium behavior by the ﬁrms and the other workers. The worker equates marginal beneﬁt
to marginal cost (horizontal light-gray line) in order to determine his search intensity (vertical
light-gray line).
Figure 4: Costs and beneﬁts of search
submarket in the same way. As a result, it is not necessary to aggregate across the submarkets. We
can focus on one particular submarket instead.
The Bellman equation for social surplus depends on a single state variable, the unemployment
rate. I start from the unemployment rate arising in the decentralized equilibrium, which I label u0,
and consider how it evolves over time as the agents in the model adjust their strategies in response
to the change in the cost parameters.
In each periodt, the main component of output is the production in the labor market by matched
ﬁrm-worker pairs. There is a mass 1 ut of such pairs, each producing 1 unit. Unemployed worker
on the other hand produce in the household. So far, it was irrelevant what components are included
in h. When considering welfare however, it is not the worker’s private value of non-market time but
the social value that is the relevant measure. In particular, if h includes unemployment beneﬁts, then
those do not add to total output, because they are simply a transfer. However, the fraction of h that
consists of unemployment beneﬁts cannot be identiﬁed with the model and data used in this paper.
Therefore, I assume that unemployment beneﬁts equal b = 0:4, roughly in line with the highest
replacement rates in the US. Household production and the worker’s value of leisure then add up to
h b.
In the beginning of the next period, a mass ut +(1 ut)(d +t  dt) of workers can search
for a new job. They incur the search cost akA. A mass vt+1;j of vacancies enters the market,
posts a contract (rj;wj), and pays the associated cost (rj  1)kR+kV. Together, this leads to a new
unemployment rate ut+1 at the beginning of the next production phase. Hence, the Bellman equation

































































































Fit of the model for the distribution of the number of applicants per ﬁrm, the number of inter-
views per ﬁrm, the number of job offers per ﬁrm, the posted wages, the screening time and the
vacancy duration. Light-gray bars represent the data and maroon bars the model. All graphs
are conditional on the ﬁrm hiring a worker. The wage residual panel shows the distribution of
log(w)+e, i.e. the unexplained component in the wages after controlling for the effect of the
observable characteristics x. The bin width is 2 for the applications, 1 for the interviews, offers
and screening time, 0.1 for the wage residuals, and 1 period (30 days) for the vacancy durations.
The graphs do not display the entire domain of the distributions; outliers are omitted.












ut+1 = (ut +(1 ut)(d +t  dt))(1 Y0)
and a, vj, rj and Y0 follow from the workers’ and ﬁrms’ decision problems and the equilibrium
structure.
I solve (23) for three different combinations of kA and kR. The results of this exercise are
summarized in table 4. In the ﬁrst scenario (‘estimated equilibrium’), I keep both cost parameters at
their estimated values. Since the market was in steady state, ut = u0 for all t  1 in that case. Social
surplus equals 234.74.
In the second scenario (‘free recruitment’), I set the recruitment cost equal to zero, while the
application cost stays at its estimated value. This leads to an equilibrium in which ﬁrms send a
ﬁnite number of applications, but ﬁrms contact all applicants. Hence, more matches are formed for
any given level of search intensity, which means that the job offer and hiring probability go up. In
general, the effect of such an increase in the matching probability on the level of search intensity
that workers choose is not obvious.38 Here I however ﬁnd that workers start to apply slightly less.
Nevertheless, the periodical matching probability for the workers increases by almost 20 percentage
points. The unemployment rate decreases over time by about 50% (4.2 percentage points). Firms
match with larger probability and slightly fewer vacancies are opened Social surplus is now 240.66,
approximately 2.5% higher than in the estimated equilibrium.
In the last scenario (‘Walrasian outcome’), I also eliminate the application cost, such that both
kR = 0 and kA = 0. In this Walrasian world, the maximum level of social surplus is obtained.
Frictions are completely eliminated and the matching process is fully efﬁcient. Both ﬁrms with
vacancies and unemployed workers match with probability 1. As a result, unemployment disappears
completely in the limit. The number of opened vacancies is at the same level as in the estimated
equilibrium.39 This scenario yields a social surplus of 245.69, which is 2.1% higher than in the
scenario with free recruitment and 4.7% higher than in the estimated equilibrium.40
38See Shimer (2004) for a discussion of this issue.
39Recall that u and v are measured at different moments in a model period: v is the number of vacancies posted in the
entry phase, whereas u equals the number of workers still without a job at the beginning of the production phase. In a
Walrasian world, the number of unmatched vacancies at the beginning of the production phase obviously equals zero as
well.
40In both scenarios, the increase in surplus consists of two effects: 1) the direct effect of the elimination of the cost
(while holding the equilibrium constant) and 2) the indirect effect via a change in the equilibrium outcomes. The indirect
effect greatly dominates both times, as can be shown by calculating the surplus while only taking the direct effect into
42kA kR a r u v Y0 h S
Estimated equilibrium 0.004 0.012 4.852 4.091 0.084 0.065 0.413 0.911 234.74
Free recruitment 0.004 0 4.44 ¥ 0.042 0.063 0.596 0.987 240.66
Walrasian outcome 0 0 ¥ ¥ 0 0.065 1 1 245.69
Equilibrium outcomes for various combinations of the search cost kA and the recruitment cost
kR. The reported values for the recruitment technology r and the hiring probability h are aver-
ages across vacancies. The reported values for u and v are the limit values.
Table 4: Magnitude of the frictions
These results demonstrate the importance of the frictions, not only regarding unemployment but
also with respect to social surplus. A reduction in the cost of search and/or recruitment can generate
considerablewelfaregains. Theresultsfurtherindicatethatrecruitmentfrictionsareroughlyequally
importantassearchfrictionsinunderstandingfrictionalunemploymentorthewelfarelosscompared
to a Walrasian world. This suggests that studies which only include search frictions but ignore




(2006) describes how many states in the US have moved away from specifying explicit criteria on
the search intensity of unemployed workers in the law, because ﬁrms “do not want repetitive and
burdensome employment applications that are ﬁled merely to meet the UI work search require-
ments.”41 In order to assess whether this issue arises in the estimated equilibrium, I consider a
scenario in which a government sets the minimum search intensity a that is required for workers
to be eligible for UI beneﬁts. Everything else is determined by the decentralized market.42 In par-
ticular, workers choose whether they want to comply with the rules, or whether they rather prefer
to forgo the beneﬁts. Starting from the estimated equilibrium, I determine how the labor market
evolves after the implementation of the policy and which effect this has on social surplus as deﬁned
in (23). I do this for minimum search intensities between 0 and 10. The results are displayed in
account. Starting from the estimated equilibrium, elimination of the recruitment cost would yield a surplus of 235.34.
Likewise, the direct effect of the elimination of the search cost increases social surplus from 240.66 to 241.16.
41Similar considerations can be found in different contexts. High-school students in the UK are restricted in the
number of college applications that they can send. Until 2008, students could send six applications. This was reduced to
ﬁve, after colleges expressed their preference for such a change in a survey, because “allowing up to six applications was
burdensome, particularly as many students’ ﬁfth and sixth applications were often poorly considered” (Department for
Education and Skills, 2006).
42Note that in real life, the rules are often stated in terms of the number of applications instead of the search intensity.
I abstract from that here.
43ﬁgure 6.
Two results are immediate. First, if the minimum search intensity is not binding because it is set
below the estimated market level of 4.852, the equilibrium does not change. Therefore, I focus on
higher values of a in the discussion below. Second, for any reasonable value of a, workers always
decide to comply, since the gain from getting unemployment beneﬁts (b = 0:4) is much larger than
the cost of a few more applications (kA = 0.004). Other results are less straightforward because of
the large number of externalities included in the model. The top right panel of ﬁgure 6 shows that
ﬁrms respond to the increase in search intensity by investing more in recruitment. For example,
setting a equal to 10 causes ﬁrms to choose a 15% higher value of r. This is consistent with the fact
that any job offer is now more likely to be rejected. The increase in r is however not sufﬁcient to
completely offset the increase in competition, as shown in the fourth panel of the ﬁgure: the increase
in the workers’ search intensity reduces the matching probability of a ﬁrm.
Hence, the ﬁrms are now worse off than before along two dimensions, which seems to be in
line with the quote from O’Leary (2006). However, we cannot ignore the effects of the policy on
the equilibrium wages. It turns out that that effect goes in the opposite direction. Wages decrease
as a result of the more intensive search by the workers (not shown in the ﬁgure). In fact, this
effect dominates, which translates into additional entry of vacancies (bottom right panel). Workers
beneﬁt from the increase in the number of vacancies since it increases their job ﬁnding probability
Y0 (third panel). As a result, unemployment falls. This change is considerable: when a is set at
10, the unemployment rate goes down by almost three percentage points. An unemployed worker
is nevertheless worse off than before, in the sense that the value of unemployment VU decreases.
The lower wages and the higher search costs dominate the positive effect of the better matching
possibilities. However, the key question in analyzing the policy is what happens to social surplus,
whichincludesallgainsandlossesfromthepolicy. Asthetopleftpanelshows, thiswelfaremeasure
goes upby about 1%. Althoughthe program aggravatesthe negative externalitiesand leadsto higher
recruitment costs for the ﬁrms, the positive externalities that result from the increase in the workers’
search intensity dominate.
Note that output does not reach a maximum for a in the interval (4.852, 10). In principle,
one can extend the analysis to ﬁnd the optimal level for the minimum level of search. However,
a lot of caution is required in such an exercise. First, the potential existence of multiple equilibria
raises the question how the market will respond to the policy. For a small change, convergence to an
equilibrium‘nearby’seemareasonableassumption. Forlargerchanges, suchanassumptionismuch
more questionable. Second, for large values of a, the assumption that A = 15 becomes restrictive.
This limits the negative impact of the recruitment friction, which leads to an overestimate of the
surplus for such high values of a. Third, the optimal level of a strongly depends on the level of
unemployment beneﬁts b, which is a variable that was not estimated. For example, if b<0:06 while
maintaining h = 0:950, the conclusion would be the opposite. In that case, an increase in search





































































































































































































Equilibrium outcomes for the policy change. The displayed values for r and h are averages
across vacancies, while u and v are limit values, reached only in the new steady state.
Figure 6: Effects of policy
45intensity decreases social surplus, even though it still leads to a higher number of matches and a
reduction of unemployment. The intuition for this result is clear: if workers are almost equally
productive at home as in a job, the social gains from search are very small. The main conclusion
from the exercise here should therefore be as follows: given the estimated parameter values, a small
increase in the required search intensity is likely to increase steady state output.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the magnitude of frictions in a labor market in which a lack of coordination
results in multilateral meetings between workers and ﬁrms. For this purpose, a directed search
model is presented in which both workers and ﬁrms decide how many agents on the other side of
the market they want to contact. Firms post a wage and recruitment technology that determines how
many applicants they will interview. After observing these contracts, workers decide how many
times and to which ﬁrms to apply. Since workers typically send multiple applications, any ﬁrm
faces the risk that its job offer gets rejected. Likewise, a worker’s application may be unsuccessful
because the ﬁrm decides to hire a different candidate. In such an environment, it is crucial to
understand the costs associated with applying and interviewing, since they determine the magnitude
of the frictions and the negative externalities caused by them.
I show that contract dispersion is a fundamental feature of the equilibrium. Some ﬁrms offer low
wages but make large investments in recruitment, while other ﬁrms do the opposite. The number of
contract types is equal to the maximum number of applications that workers may send in any given
period and ﬁrms are indifferent between all types. Workers face a trade-off between the wage and
the probability to get a job offer. Applications to low wage ﬁrms are more likely to turn into job
offers than applications to high wage ﬁrms. It is shown that workers maximize the payoff from their
application portfolio by spreading their applications over the different types of contracts.
Estimation of the model then provides values for the cost of search and recruitment. An addi-
tional application is estimated to cost the worker 0.73 hours of his time, while ﬁrms incur a cost
equal to 1.97 hours of production for each interview. By simulating the equilibrium for different
values of the two cost parameters, the market equilibrium is compared to the frictionless, Walrasian
outcome. Social surplus is 4.7% lower in the market equilibrium than in a Walrasian world. Search
and recruitment frictions are each responsible for approximately half of this loss in surplus. Finally,
I argue that there is a potential role for active labor market programs, since programs that marginally
increase the level of search intensity of unemployed workers increase social surplus, even though
they negatively affect the ﬁrms’ hiring probability.
An interesting avenue for future work would be to allow for more productivity differences
among workers and ﬁrms. This would make the model suitable to study settings in which het-
erogeneity plays a larger role than in the sample that I use here. In such an environment, ﬁrms’
46choices regarding the recruitment technology will most likely also have important implications for
the amount of sorting in the labor market. For such work however, the availability of high-quality
data on the decisions of both ﬁrms and workers will be essential.
47A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider a ﬁrm with queue length l and recruitment technology r. The number of applicants
i follows a Poisson distribution with mean l, while the interview capacity j follows geometric
distribution with parameter r  r 1
r . The actual number of interviews is equal to minfi; jg. Hence,





































































A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider the job offer probability y ﬁrst.43 Let r = r 1
r . When a worker applies to a ﬁrm,
he will in general face a number of competitors, i.e. other applicants at the same ﬁrm. Let m denote
the number of competitors who are qualiﬁed and will accept the job if offered to them. On the other
hand, let n denote the number of competitors who are either unqualiﬁed or will reject the job in
favor of a better offer. In order to simplify terminology, I refer to the ﬁrst type of competitors as
‘direct competitors’. The second type is called ‘indirect competitors’, since they only reduce the
worker’s matching probability by causing congestion.
A number of applicants will be selected for an interview. Each applicant is equally likely to
be selected and to be qualiﬁed. Therefore, I assume without loss of generality that if the ﬁrm has
multiple qualiﬁed candidates, it makes offers among them in the same order as in which it conducted
the interviews. Hence, one can interpret the recruitment as a process with multiple rounds, which
ends when the ﬁrm selects a qualiﬁed applicant who accepts the job, or when the maximum possible
number of interviews has been held.
For the worker it is not relevant in which round he gets the job offer. Getting a job offer in round
i and getting one in round j are mutually exclusive events, since the ﬁrm will offer the job to each
worker at most once. Hence, the probability that the worker gets a job offer equals the probability
43In this proof, I omit the dependence of the job offer probability, the matching probability and the queue lengths on
the contract c in order to keep notation as simple as possible.
48that he gets an offer in round i, summed over all possible i. In order for the worker to get a job offer
in round i, several things must happen: (i) the ﬁrm must be able to interview at least i applicants, (ii)
only indirect competitors must have been selected in round 1;:::;i 1, (iii) the worker gets selected

















as long as i  n+1 and zero otherwise. Hence, the total probability that the worker gets a job offer
equals









which goes to 1
m+1 for r ! ¥.
Actually, the number of competitors that a worker faces is a random variable. Both m and n
follow Poisson distributions with respective parameters m and n = l  m. Hence, the probability to
compete with exactly m direct and n indirect competitors equals













ˆ y(n;mjr) fm;n(m;njm;l  m):








































































with k = 1
rl + r 1



















An expression for the ﬁrm’s matching probability h can be derived in a similar way. Consider a
ﬁrm with interview capacity R. Suppose that it has m qualiﬁed applicants who would accept the
job and n other applicants. The number of workers from the former group selected from the former
group follows a hypergeometric distribution and the ﬁrm will match if this number is at least one.
In order to derive a closed-form expression for the matching probability, I follow the same approach



























which goes to 1 for r ! ¥.
Both m and n follow Poisson distributions with respective parameters m and n = l  m. Hence,

























































50A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the proof provided by Galenianos & Kircher (2009). Con-
sider application i > 1 and suppose it is not sent to a contract offering a wage in the interval
[ ¯ wi 1; ¯ wi]. Then there are two possibilities: 1) the application is sent to a contract offering a wage
w > ¯ wi or 2) the application is sent to a contract offering a wage w < ¯ wi 1. By the deﬁnition of ¯ wi,
the ﬁrst case would give the worker a payoff that is strictly lower than Vi, which cannot be optimal.
In the second case, the worker could do better by deviating and sending the application to ¯ wi 1. Let
¯ ci denote the contract (r; ¯ wi), then the utility gain from deviating equals
(y(¯ ci 1)VE ( ¯ wi 1)+(1 y(¯ ci 1))Vi 1) (y(c)VE (w)+(1 y(c))Vi 1) =
(y(¯ ci 1)(VE ( ¯ wi 1) Vi 2) y(c)(VE (w) Vi 2))+(y(c) y(¯ ci 1))(Vi 1 Vi 2) > 0:
The ﬁrst term is non-negative, since ¯ wi 1 maximizes y(¯ ci 1)(VE ( ¯ wi 1) Vi 2) by deﬁnition. The
second term is positive, since ¯ wi 1 > w implies that y(¯ ci 1) < y(c).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the proof provided by Kircher (2009). First, note that for
wages w below ¯ w0 = V 1
E (V1), the market utility cannot be obtained. As a result, k(c) = 0 and
y(c) = f. At w = V 1
E (V1), the market utility can only be obtained if k(c) = 0 and y(c) = f.
Lemma 2 establishes that the ﬁrst application is sent to a wage in the interval
 
V 1
E (V1); ¯ w1

. As
a result, y(c)VE (w)+(1 y(c))V0 = V1 needs to hold for all wages in this interval in order to
satisfy the market utility condition. A similar argument applies to the other interval. Application
i > 1 is sent to the interval [ ¯ wi 1; ¯ wi], which implies that the effective queue length k(c) and the
job offer probability y(c) are governed by equation (15). The effective queue length has to be
continuous in the wage. This implies that ¯ wi is determined as the wage at which equation (15) holds
for both i and i+1. Solving the two equations yields





A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose that the lemma does not hold and that ﬁrms of type i offer the same contract (r;w)
as ﬁrms of type i+1. By lemma 3, we must then have that w = ¯ wi. Let yi denote the associated
51job offer probability. If the worker gets a job offer from both ﬁrms, but no higher one, if will accept
the offer from ﬁrm i+1 by construction. As a result, the acceptance probabilities for both ﬁrms are
related as follows
1 Yi = (1 yi)(1 Yi+1) < 1 Yi+1:
Consider ﬁrst ¯ wi 2 [0;1). If the ﬁrms of type i offer a marginally higher wage w0 # ¯ wi, their ac-
ceptance probability jumps up to 1 Yi+1. Clearly, such a deviation is proﬁtable. Next, consider
¯ wi = 1. In that case, the ﬁrms make zero proﬁts. At wages slightly below one, the queue length is
lower but still positive. This deviation therefore yields higher proﬁts to the ﬁrm.











Start with the optimization over the effective queue length. The second derivative of the objective
function with respect to k equals
 
rf (1 Yi)e k (VE (1) Vi 1)
1+(r 1)f (1 Yi)
;
which is strictly negative for all k 2 Ki. Consequently, the objective function is strictly concave in
the effective queue length.
The ﬁrst order condition is given by
rf (1 Yi)






Solving for ˆ ki yields
ˆ ki = log
f (VE (1) Vi 1)
Vi Vi 1
If ˆ ki 2Ki, the optimal effective queue length is deﬁned by this expression, i.e. k
i = ˆ ki. On the other
hand, if ˆ ki < ¯ ki 1, then k
i = ¯ ki 1.
































The latter is strictly negative for all r 2 R, which implies that the objective function is strictly

































Hence, the optimal recruitment technology r
i equals b ri if b ri > 1, and 1 otherwise.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof closely follows Galenianos & Kircher (2005, 2009).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof closely follows Galenianos & Kircher (2005).
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